

FS-ISAC

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THE PUZZLE
OF PAYMENTS SECURITY:

*Fitting the Pieces Together
to Protect the Retail Payments System*



Information Sharing



To be forewarned is to be fore-armed

MISSION:

Sharing Timely, Relevant, Actionable Cyber and Physical Security Information & Analysis

- A nonprofit private sector initiative formed in 1999
- Designed/developed/owned by financial services industry
- Mitigate cybercrime, hactivist, nation state activity
- Process thousands of threat indicators per month
- 2004: 68 members; 2014: 5900 participants
- 2500 members bound by operating rules
- Sharing information globally



FS-ISAC Operations


Information Sources



FS-ISAC 24x7 Security Operations Center



Member Communications



Information Sharing & Analysis Tools

Threat Data, Information Sharing

- ⦿ **Anonymous Submissions**
- ⦿ **CyberIntel Listserver**
- ⦿ Relevant/Actionable Cyber & Physical Alerts (Portal)
- ⦿ **Special Interest Group Listservers (Payments Risk Council and Payment Processor Information Sharing Council)**
- ⦿ Document Repository
- ⦿ Member Surveys
- ⦿ Risk Mitigation Toolkit
- ⦿ Threat Viewpoints

Ongoing Engagement


- ⦿ Bi-weekly Threat Calls
- ⦿ Emergency Member Calls
- ⦿ Semi-Annual Member Meetings and Conferences
- ⦿ Regional Outreach Program
- ⦿ Bi-Weekly Educational Webinars

Readiness Exercises

- ⦿ US and EU Government Sponsored Exercises
- ⦿ **Cyber Attack against Payment Processes (CAPP) Exercise**
- ⦿ Advanced Threat/DDoS Exercise
- ⦿ Industry exercises-Systemic Threat, Quantum Dawn Two, etc.



Information Sharing: Traffic Light Protocol



- Restricted to a defined group (e.g., only those present in a meeting.) Information labeled RED should not be shared with anyone outside of the group
- This information may be shared with FS-ISAC members
- Information may be shared with FS-ISAC members and partners (e.g., vendors, MSSPs, customers). Information in this category is not to be shared in public forums
- This information may be shared freely and is subject to standard copyright rules

How FS-ISAC Works: Circles of Trust



IRC	Insurance Risk Council
CHEF	Clearing House and Exchange Forum
PRC	Payments Risk Council
PPISC	Payment Processor Information Sharing Council
CIC	Community Institution Council
CAC	Compliance and Audit Council
TIC	Threat Intelligence Committee
Cyber Intel	Cyber Intelligence List



Automation Inflection Points

2014

Security automation launched

1999

FS-ISAC established

1993

All electronic ACH

1981

First version of online banking

1978

Electronic Funds Transfer Act

1876

First commercial telephone
installation-by two bankers

The need for speed

Attackers have honed their skills to come at you rapidly

Defenders take a long time to feel the impact of an attack

	Seconds	Minutes	Hours	Days	Weeks	Months
Initial Attack to Initial Compromise (Shorter Time Worse)	 10%	 75%	 12%	 2%	0%	 1%
Initial Compromise to Data Exfiltration (Shorter Time Worse)	 8%	 38%	 14%	 25%	 8%	 8%
Initial Compromise to Discovery (Longer Time Worse)	0%	0%	 2%	 13%	 29%	 54%

SECURITY AUTOMATION STATUS

- **Soltra– joint venture between FS-ISAC and DTCC**
 - Industry-owned utility to automate threat intelligence sharing
 - DTCC IT & scalability; FS-ISAC community & best practices
 - Funded by the industry, including SIFMA and some of its largest members
 - Open standards (STIX, TAXII)
 - Provide platform that can be extended to all sizes of financial services firms, other ISACs and industries
 - Integrate with vendor solutions (firewalls, intrusion detection, anti-virus, threat intelligence, etc.)
- **Soltra Edge**
 - First available was on 12/3/2014
 - FS-ISAC instance, January 2015
 - Over 900 downloads of Soltra Edge, less than half from financial services sector
 - Adapter and Network capabilities -- 2015



STIX Constructs

An open standard to categorize cyber threat intelligence information

Atomic



Observable

What threat activity are we seeing?

Tactical



Indicator

What threats should I look for on my networks and systems and why?

Operational



Incident

Where has this threat been seen?



Course of Action

What can I do about it?



ExploitTarget

What weaknesses does this threat exploit?

Strategic



ThreatActor

Who is responsible for this threat?



Campaign

Why do they do this?



TTP

What do they do?

Threat Intelligence Automation Solution

- Instead of 2% or less of attacks blocked, detected, or prevented, a much higher percentage of attacks are stopped.

