Abstract

The U.S. economy came into the pandemic, and looks likely to leave it, on a slow-growth path. The near-term level of potential output has fallen because of shortfalls in labor that should reverse over time. Labor productivity, to a surprising degree, has followed an accelerated version of its Great Recession path—with initially strong growth followed by weak growth. But, as of mid-2022, it appears that the overall level of labor and total factor productivity are only modestly affected. The sign of the effect depends on whether we use the strong income-side measures of pandemic output growth or the much weaker expenditure-side measures. There is considerable heterogeneity across industries. We can explain some but not all of the heterogeneity through industry differences in cyclical utilization and off-the-clock hours worked. After accounting for these factors, industries where it is easy to work from home have grown somewhat faster than they did pre-pandemic. In contrast, industries where it is hard to work from home have performed extremely poorly.

Keywords: Growth accounting, productivity, potential output.

JEL codes: E01, E23, E24, O47
1 Introduction

How will COVID-19 affect the level and growth rate of GDP going forward? The answer matters directly for well-being. It also matters for policy makers. For example, the level and growth of potential output matters for monetary policymakers assessing the degree of slack and inflationary pressures, as well as for fiscal policymakers assessing future budget balances.

Figure 1 provides a stylized view of how the pandemic might have affected potential output. The thin grey line shows the pre-pandemic path. As the thick black line shows, the pandemic could knock the level of potential off course. Such changes could be permanent (as shown) or temporary. The dashed line shows a post-COVID change in the growth rate.

We explore these issues with a standard growth-accounting framework and provide a preliminary quantitative assessment of some of the channels. These “known knowns” suggest a hit of several percentage points to the near-term level of potential output, mainly coming through a shortfall of full-employment labor. The near-term path of capital input and (cyclically adjusted) total factor productivity (TFP) have been less affected.

Although necessarily more speculative, we find little evidence that the pandemic has so far caused substantial changes, up or down, to the economy’s sluggish pre-pandemic longer-run growth-rate path (see, for example, Fernald and Li 2019). The pandemic does not seem likely to lead to sharp changes in research effort or in the idea production function that would push us away from the slow-productivity-growth trajectory; demographics mean that labor-supply growth is likely to remain low by historical standards. Our modal forecast is that longer-run GDP growth (say, 5 to 10 years out) is likely to remain between $1\frac{1}{2}$ and $1\frac{3}{4}$ percent.

We delve deeply into the pandemic productivity data, looking for clues about level and growth rate effects. Many economic statistics have behaved in extreme and unexpected ways during the pandemic. In contrast, and despite considerable commentary to the contrary, aggregate productivity has behaved in surprisingly predictable cyclical ways.

Figure 2 illustrates how the major movements in labor productivity during the pandemic reflect cyclical dynamics similar to an accelerated version of those observed during the Great Recession period. The thick black line shows the log-level of labor productivity; the grey solid line shows fitted values from a regression of quarterly U.S. labor productivity growth on

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1 A word on semantics. We refer to the post-2019 period to the present (2022Q3) as the pandemic period. We sometimes differentiate the recession (the first half of 2020) from the recovery period that has followed.
year-over-year changes in the unemployment rate. We estimate the equation from 1995 through 2019, allowing the trend growth rate to change after 2004. We then predict pandemic productivity growth conditional on the observed path of the unemployment rate.\footnote{The regression broadly follows Fernald, Hall, Stock, and Watson (2017) and Daly, Fernald, Óscar Jordà, and Nechio (2017). Fernald et al. examine a wide range of labor market and productivity-related variables. They cyclically-adjust them by regressing their growth rates on the contemporaneous change in the unemployment rate along with leads and lags. For labor productivity, we cannot reject that the simple four-quarter change captures the effects. The coefficients and fitted values are virtually identical if estimation starts a decade earlier. Very recent work by Gordon and Sayed (2022) reaches substantially the same conclusion we do with a richer dynamic specification, suggesting that the results in the figure are not driven by the simplicity of our approach.}

Pandemic commentary on productivity has largely ignored its predictable cyclicality. Since the mid-1980s, labor productivity has been countercyclical—rising in recessions, when the unemployment rate rises. (See, for example, the survey in Fernald and Wang 2016.) If the unemployment rate were constant, then the fitted value in the figure would match the dashed broken-trend line, with fast trend productivity growth during the Internet boom years and slow trend growth after about 2004. During the Great Recession, unemployment rose sharply and labor productivity rose above trend. That recession boost slowly waned as the economy gradually returned to full employment over the subsequent decade. As Section 4 discusses, the growth-accounting reasons for the productivity surge in the Great Recession were capital deepening (as hours fell) and labor composition (as workers with less education and experience disproportionately lost jobs). As these factors reversed, the level of productivity
Figure 2: The procyclicality of labor productivity

\[ \Delta LP_t = c_t + 0.84 \Delta^4 U_t \]

Notes: Figure shows (i) the log-level of U.S. business-sector labor productivity since 1995 along with (ii) an estimated time-varying trend and (iii) cumulated fitted values from the growth-rate regression shown. Regression shown relates labor productivity growth (\( \Delta \ln LP_t \)) to the four-quarter change in the unemployment rate (\( \Delta^4 U_t \)) and is estimated 1995:4-2019:4. Constant term, \( c_t \), changes after 2004:4. The 2020-22 fitted values condition on actual unemployment path. Productivity growth averages the income- and expenditure measures of output growth. Data end 2022Q2.

returned to its long-term trend.

The same story broadly fits pandemic productivity experience. Given the rapid rise in the unemployment rate in 2020, the regression equation accurately predicts the initially strong pace of productivity growth; the subsequent rapid decline in unemployment qualitatively fits the subsequent productivity reversal. Given the simple and unconditional nature of the regression, and given how unusual the pandemic experience has been in so many ways, the fit is surprisingly good. Similar to the Great Recession period, growth accounting explains the initial surge through strong capital deepening and rising labor composition; the subsequent weakness coincided with a reversal of these factors.\(^3\)

In terms of level effects on productivity, there has been no shortage of speculation. Some stories focus on the benefits of working from home and from accelerated intangible learning of (and coordination on) new business models. In 2020, when productivity growth was strong,

\(^3\)We cannot explain all of the fluctuations in productivity, including the more than 4 percent annual-rate decline in business-sector labor productivity in the first half of 2022 (using data as of September 1, 2022). We can, however, partially explain the decline through negative contributions from capital deepening, labor composition, and factor utilization. Of course, the data will be revised in coming years; and productivity is volatile in the best of times.
commentators emphasized these positive stories. But other stories emphasize disruptive effects such as supply-chain bottlenecks, production disruptions, and the need for increased intermediate inputs. (Section 4.1 surveys these arguments, with references.)

We find that the average pandemic growth rates of labor and total factor productivity are not that different from their averages over the 15 years prior to the pandemic. It could be that the positive and negative speculative effects largely offset—or the effects could be small. An important source of uncertainty is that income-side measures of business output have grown nearly 2 percent faster (at an annual rate) than expenditure-side measures. The income-side data are consistent with the positive effects of the pandemic dominating. The expenditure-side (where business labor productivity growth averages only 0.7 percent from 2019Q4 through 2022Q2) are consistent with the adverse/disruptive effects dominating. Our default is to average the two measures, leading to the apparent offset.

To gain further insight, we turn to industry labor-productivity data. (These are benchmarked to the overall weak expenditure-side data.) Industry reallocation from low to high productivity-level industries was important in 2020 but has largely reversed, so most pandemic productivity growth has been within-industry. And when we look into the industry evidence, the industry data are consistent with a view that the magnitude of both the positive and the negative effects is large. “Work-from-home” industries (with high teleworkability, following Dingel and Neiman (2020)) had very strong pandemic productivity performance, consistent with the positive stories. But the performance of goods-producing industries is poor; the performance of contact-intensive industries is atrocious.

Thus, the limited apparent effect of the pandemic on aggregate productivity hides considerable heterogeneity. We can explain some but not all of the strength of work-from-home industries through rising factor utilization and increases in off-the-clock hours (as workers use some of their reduced commuting time to work more (Barrero, Bloom, Davis, and Meyer, 2021)). These adjustments explain none of the weak performance in goods industries, and go the wrong way for contact-intensive industries.

The industry evidence is thus consistent with the view that high-teleworkability industries reap productivity gains, e.g., from the shift to working from home or from accelerated digital

\footnote{In addition to Dingel and Neiman (2020), our analysis groups and labels industries following recent work by Gordon and Sayed (2022) into work from home, contact, and goods industries.}
learning. The low-teleworkability goods and contact industries, in contrast, bear the brunt of adverse/disruptive effects. This interpretation of the industry results is consistent with the results in Bloom, Bunn, Mizen, Smietanka, and Thwaites (2020), based on a survey of the quantitative expectations of UK firms. They find that the near- and medium-term effect on firm-level TFP was more likely to be positive for firms where more of the work can be done from home, and where sales do not depend as much on face-to-face contact with customers. In contrast, for firms where it is harder to work from home and where sales depend on face-to-face contact, firms expected more negative near and medium-term effects on TFP.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the growth-accounting framework we use to assess potential output. The framework describes the level and slope of the lines in Figure 1. We focus on a production-function definition of potential output: the level of output given actual capital and technology, assuming capital and labor (both hours and labor composition) are utilized at “normal” levels. In Section 3, we apply this framework to discuss the “past future” of growth—that is, pre-pandemic reasons why future growth was expected to remain relatively slow. This analysis shapes our benchmark view on the slope of the pre-pandemic trend line in Figure 1. The remainder of the paper assesses the evidence on changes in the level or growth rate.

Section 4 discusses pandemic productivity performance. We first summarize the speculative debate about whether the pandemic will boost or harm the level of productivity—i.e., “known unknowns.” We then turn to the data. Aggregate growth accounting suggests sizeable cyclical effects but little overall effect on productivity growth. With income-side measures of output, the positive channels may dominate; with expenditure-side measures, it looks like the negative channels dominate. We then turn to industry data and document the heterogeneity in performance that is positively associated with teleworkability. We discuss a range of interpretations of this relationship.

Section 5 discusses the degree to which the pandemic might have affected the potential level of labor or capital—and, hence, the level of potential output—in the near-term. Our best guess

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5This is the definition used by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and many policy organizations. It is related to, but conceptually a little different than, the flexible-price equilibrium level, because labor supply or factor utilization might optimally vary in response to some shocks in a way not allowed for with the production-function approach. Nevertheless, Kiley (2013) argues that, in a carefully specified dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, the flexible-price measure of the output gap comoves reasonably closely with a production-function based measure. (See Fernald (2015) for further discussion.) In any case, in the long run, the two approaches are equivalent.
is that, as of 2022, COVID-19 has reduced the level of potential output. Reduced labor supply is the most clearcut case, reflecting factors such as early retirements. Despite an economy that, as of mid-2022, showed clear signs of overheating, total-economy hours worked remain well below where we would have expected based on pre-pandemic trends. Section 6 looks beyond the recent pandemic productivity data to assess whether the pandemic might have changed the economy’s slow-growth pace. Although there is considerable inherent uncertainty, we find little so far to suggest major changes in the slow-growth trajectory.

2 Potential output accounting framework

A standard way to think about potential output growth is in terms of growth in inputs and the efficiency with which those inputs are used. The following constant-returns aggregate production function, in growth rates, provides our organizing framework:

$$\Delta \ln y = \alpha \Delta \ln k + (1 - \alpha) (\Delta \ln h + \Delta \ln lc) + \Delta \ln tfp$$

(1)

All variables, including factor shares, have time subscripts that we omit for simplicity. $\Delta \ln y$ is output growth, $\alpha$ is capital’s output elasticity (and, under standard conditions, its factor share), and $\Delta \ln k$ is capital-input growth, “Effective” labor growth is the sum of hours growth, $\Delta \ln h$, and labor-composition growth, $\Delta \ln lc$. Labor composition captures the effect of education and experience on productivity, and has been standard in growth accounting since Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). For example, in 1950 only 34 percent of Americans age 25 and older had graduated from high school and only 6 percent had graduated from college. Today, 90 percent have graduated from high school and 34 percent have graduated from college.

$\Delta \ln tfp$ is total-factor-productivity growth, which is defined implicitly by this equation as output growth not explained by share-weighted input growth. In the long run, TFP captures productivity benefits from many sources. These include formal and informal research and development, improvements in management practices, and reallocation as high-productivity businesses expand while low-productivity businesses contract or exit. Because it is measured

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Formally, suppose the production function has $N$ types of labor, so that $Y = F(K, H_1, H_2, ... H_N)$. Then the standard Solow accounting would imply $\Delta \ln y = \alpha \Delta \ln k + (1 - \alpha) \sum_i s_{Li} \Delta \ln h_i/(1 - \alpha) + \Delta \ln tfp$, where $s_{Li}$ is the revenue share of labor input $i$. If $H = \sum_i H_i$ is total hours worked, then $\Delta \ln lc \equiv \sum_i s_{Li} \Delta \ln h_i/(1 - \alpha) - \Delta \ln h$. 

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as a residual, it also inherits any mismeasurement of output elasticities or factor inputs.\footnote{Markups, for example, affect output elasticities (relative to observed factor shares) and can easily lead to time-varying misallocation. Basu and Fernald (2002) find that the reallocation terms they can identify are primarily cyclical. We discuss input mismeasurement in the form of time-varying factor utilization later; intangible investments also lead to mismeasurement of both inputs and output. TFP growth would also inherit any mismeasurement of output growth due to mismeasurement of the price index used to convert nominal output growth into real output growth (See Broda and Weinstein (2010), Byrne, Fernald, and Reinsdorf (2016), and Aghion, Bergeaud, Boppart, Klenow, and Li (2019)).}

By estimating or projecting the variables on the right-hand side of (1), we can estimate potential growth. In particular, we can estimate what labor and TFP growth would be if the economy were at “full employment”, and we can estimate what actual capital input is based on investment flows (and project it using estimates of future investment).

In the long run, it is useful to decompose output growth identically as the sum of growth in labor productivity and hours, because different economic forces determine those two pieces:

\[ \Delta \ln y = (\Delta \ln y - \Delta \ln h) + \Delta \ln h. \] (2)

Rearranging the production function (1), labor productivity growth depends on the contributions of capital deepening, labor composition, and TFP:

\[ \Delta \ln y - \Delta \ln h = \alpha (\Delta \ln k - \Delta \ln h - \Delta \ln lc) + \Delta \ln lc + \Delta \ln tfp. \] (3)

In standard growth models, capital is endogenous. In the one-sector model, steady-state growth in the capital-labor ratio grows at the rate of labor-augmenting technical progress:

\[ \Delta \ln k - \Delta \ln h - \Delta \ln lc = \Delta \ln tfp / (1 - \alpha). \] It then follows from equation (3) that

\[ \Delta \ln y - \Delta \ln h = \frac{\Delta \ln tfp}{1 - \alpha} + \Delta \ln lc. \] (4)

Thus, in the long run, labor productivity depends on technology and labor composition. Output also depends on hours growth \( \Delta \ln h \), which depends primarily on demographics.

In what follows, we assume that TFP growth (and, hence, labor productivity) is largely independent of demographics in the long run. There are models where TFP growth itself depends, typically positively, on demographics. Given that the U.S. and advanced economies expect only slow growth in the working age population, allowing for demographics to affect TFP growth would reinforce our slow-growth message. These demographic forces could
reduce idea-creation (e.g., Jones (2002) and Fernald and Jones (2014), Peters and Walsh (2019)) and put pressure on TFP growth.\footnote{Peters and Walsh (2019) provide further discussion and references. As a counterpoint, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2021) argue that slow demographics may speed the pace of automation.}

In the quarters or even years immediately following the COVID recession (or other downturns), equation (2) is less useful as a guide to near- or long-term potential output. The reason is that each growth-accounting component of labor productivity in equation (3) is substantially affected by the business cycle—and not in the same direction. For this reason, when we focus on the near-term level of potential output, we focus directly on equation (1). For the longer-term, however, where capital is endogenous, we focus on equations (2) and (4).

In Section 4, we will seek to glean insights from the behavior of productivity during the pandemic. So it is useful to briefly review the literature on the cyclicality of productivity (see Fernald and Wang 2016 for a survey). One of our takeaways will be that the cyclical behavior of productivity during the pandemic period looks like an accelerated version of what we saw during the Great Recession. This takeaway was not a foregone conclusion since the relationship between productivity growth and cyclical indicators is not structural but can depend on the shocks hitting the economy and the margins that firms choose to use to adjust.

As Biddle (2014) points out, conventional wisdom about whether productivity is procyclical or countercyclical has changed several times over the past century. Until the mid-1980s, productivity in the data was procyclical. It has been countercyclical since. Looking at the components of equation (3), measured TFP remains procyclical because of fluctuations in factor utilization: capital’s workweek and labor effort fall in recessions (Basu, Fernald, and Kimball, 2006). But capital deepening and labor composition are countercyclical, rising in recessions. Capital deepening rises because measured capital is relatively smooth and hours falls.\footnote{This statement uses measured capital; we incorporate cyclical changes in the workweek of capital—capital utilization—into factor utilization. Capital deepening captures the effect of diminishing marginal product of labor; it’s why we typically draw labor demand curves as downward sloping.} And in recessions, workers with less education and experience are more likely to lose jobs, so the education level (and marginal product) of workers who remain employed rises.

Why did labor productivity become countercyclical after the mid-1980s? Fernald and Wang (2016) point empirically to reduced variation in factor utilization and survey a range of possible explanations. Barnichon (2010) shows in a New Keynesian model that reductions in the importance of demand shocks could lead to the observed attenuation in the importance of
utilization. Gali and van Rens (2020) attribute the change to reduced hiring frictions. Gordon and Sayed (2022) point to “excess layoffs” as firms panicked in the Great Recession and pandemic (they also find countercyclicality only around recessions).

3 The “Past Future” of Growth

As a benchmark, we start with a pre-pandemic perspective on expected longer-run U.S. growth. We use the decomposition in equation (2) that focuses on labor productivity and hours. This discussion establishes some “facts” about pre-pandemic growth in productivity, hours, and GDP. Before the pandemic, future growth looked likely to be slow.

Figure 3 shows growth in GDP for selected periods decomposed into productivity (GDP per hour) and hours. The dark shaded productivity segments highlight how productivity growth has shifted between normal and exceptional “regimes” (Fernald, 2016).\(^\text{10}\) Productivity growth was fast from 1948 to 1973, with GDP per hour growth of \(2^{3/4}\) percent. Productivity growth then slowed to only \(1^{1/4}\) percent from 1973 to 1995. The Internet and other information-technology-related innovations then boosted productivity to a bit above \(2^{1/2}\) percent for about a decade.

From 2004 through 2019, however, productivity growth was slow once again (averaging 1.1 percent). Thus, prior to the pandemic, the U.S. economy was in a slow-growth regime. Regimes generally appear persistent—lasting a decade or longer. If the regime switches follow a Markov process, then the likelihood of a regime switch does not depend on how long we have been in the current regime. Foerster and Matthes (2020) estimate, from TFP data, that both high and low TFP-growth regimes are expected to last about 15 years.

The regimes view is consistent with the view that unusually influential innovations—such as the electric dynamo, the internal combustion engine, the interstate highway system, and the Internet—lead to complementary innovations that boost productivity growth broadly for a

\(^\text{10}\)Fernald (2015) and Fernald, Hall, Stock, and Watson (2017) provide formal break tests that largely correspond to the slow- and fast-productivity-growth regimes shown in the table. Kahn and Rich (2007) use a multivariate regime-switching model—with labor productivity, real wages, consumption per hour, and (detrended) hours. Their updated estimates, available at Kahn’s web page, date the mid-2000s productivity slowdown at the end of 2004. As of September 2022, they estimate a 0.99 probability that the U.S. economy was in a slow-productivity growth regime in 2022Q2.
Figure 3: Real GDP, hours, and productivity

Notes: Bars show average annualized GDP growth for periods shown, decomposed into productivity (GDP per hour) and hours. GDP is the geometric average of the BEA's expenditure-side (GDP) and income-side (GDI) measures. Total economy hours are from the BLS. $g^*$ projection assumes GDP per hour grows at 2004-19 pace, and that hours grow at CBO (2022) projected 2027-32 labor-force growth (five to ten years out). Growth rates calculated as 100 x log change. Each subperiod is labeled by the first and last years of the levels data used to calculate growth rates.

Of course, productivity is highly uncertain both statistically and economically. Under the regimes view, much of the statistical uncertainty is about which regime we will be in. Neither economists nor statisticians have a good track record of forecasting changes in trend productivity growth, which is why a Markov structure for the transition matrix is a reasonable modeling choice. For example, artificial intelligence and robots may eventually bring a massive productivity payoff—but we do not know when it will happen. In addition, even within a regime, productivity is inherently volatile from year to year.

The far right bar shows a straightforward, if pessimistic, benchmark projection for potential, or longer-run, GDP growth, $g^*$. The longer run is the period over which a steady-state projection for GDP (equations (2) and (4)) is a good approximation. The Federal Open Market Committee's...

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12 The speed of adoption and diffusion is key. In the late 1990s, a popular saying was, "The Internet changes everything." A quarter century later, the Internet has transformed much of human life, to the point where it is hard to imagine living without the Internet. And yet, the pace of transformation was much slower than the 1990s Internet evangelists, and productivity growth has been only modest since 2004, despite the ongoing transformation.
Summary of Economic Projections defines the “longer run” as five or six years.\textsuperscript{13}

The bar projects growth of only a little above $1 \frac{1}{2}$ percent, and corresponds to the slope of the “pre-pandemic trajectory” line in Figure 1. We assumes GDP per hour grows in the 1 to $1 \frac{1}{4}$ percent range, consistent with a slow-productivity growth regime. The bar shown assumes productivity growth remains at its 2004-19 pace of 1.1 percent. (Even if the modal expectation is that we stay in this slow-growth regime for the next decade or longer, the mean expectation is higher, because it incorporates the probability of a switch to a high-growth regime.)

Still, the key reason to expect low future output growth is demographics. The assumed longer-run hours growth rate is 0.37 percent per year, from the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) forecast for labor-force growth between five and ten years out (CBO, 2022). This forecast accounts for population aging, participation decisions of different groups, and immigration; it does not appear much different from the longer-run 2019 CBO forecast.\textsuperscript{14}

Our goal in what follows is to understand how the pandemic might have affected the level or growth rate of this pre-pandemic path. To gain insight, we now turn to understanding productivity during the pandemic. We return to long-run growth considerations (from a semi-endogenous growth perspective) in Section 6.

4 Productivity in the pandemic

The economy has acted in extreme and unusual ways during the pandemic. In this section, we argue that, to a surprising degree, the behavior of productivity has remained consistent with pre-pandemic cyclical and trend dynamics. Indeed, the aggregate productivity data look like an accelerated version of what we saw during and following the Great Recession.

We begin by discussing some of the “known unknowns” regarding pandemic effects on productivity. Some channels are positive, such as forced digital learning and direct productivity benefits from working from home. Others are negative, such as supply-chain\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{14}
disruptions and the need for increased intermediate inputs. We then turn to the data. Aggregate growth accounting suggests sizeable cyclical effects but little overall effect on potential productivity. With income-side measures of output, the positive channels may dominate; with expenditure-side measures, it looks like the negative channels dominate.

We then look at underlying industry patterns. Although there were major shifts away from high-contact industries early in the pandemic, some of those shifts have reversed, so that composition effects on labor productivity were small as of early 2022. But, looking more closely at the industry patterns, “work-from-home” industries (characterized by high levels of teleworkability) show unusually strong productivity growth. In contrast, low-teleworkability industries have seen productivity performance that ranges from poor to disastrous. These industries may have received few of the benefits while disproportionately bearing the costs. An optimistic view is that the costs may dissipate while the benefits persist.

4.1 TFP speculations

Since the pandemic began, speculation has often highlighted ways in which the pandemic may have boosted the level, if not the growth rate, of productivity. But some channels suggest, instead, adverse effects. The channels would mostly show up in TFP.

Most obviously, the pandemic forced firms to experiment with new ways of doing business. Conceptually, this was an investment in intangible knowledge that might not otherwise have taken place, or would have happened more slowly. The resulting knowledge—as well as social coordination on new production modes—may raise the level of efficiency even if we eventually return to something close to the old normal. For example, as businesses have coordinated on videoconferencing for important meetings, it may permanently reduce the frequency of costly business travel (even if Zoom is an imperfect substitute for in-person interaction).

A particularly salient example is the widespread shift to working from home (WFH). In surveys, workers value the option to work from home; they typically report being at least as productive, if not more so, at home as in the office (e.g., Barrero, Bloom, and Davis (2021)). They also report using almost half of their reduced commuting time on work. That said, direct evidence on the productivity benefits of WFH suggest it may depend on the job (and, by

\[For\ optimistic\ takes, see, for example, Economist (2020), Torres (2021), and Hill (2022).\]
extension, the task). Call centers appear more productive remotely. Bloom, Liang, Roberts, and Ying (2015) find in a randomized control study that WFH substantially increased productivity and output for Chinese call center workers. Similarly, Emanuel and Harrington (2022) find that during the pandemic-induced shift to remote work, formerly-on-site call-center workers at a U.S. Fortune 500 retailer were 6 to 10 percent more productive. In contrast, Gibbs, Mengel, and Siemroth (2021) find that IT professionals, whose role involved more coordination, were less productive remotely; they got as much work done only because they worked longer hours.

In a related but different vein, Brucks and Levav (2022) document in an interactive lab setting that videoconferencing inhibits the production of creative ideas. Consistent with these somewhat mixed results, Etheridge, Wang, and Tang (2020) find that self-reported WFH productivity "varies substantially across socioeconomic groups, industries, and occupations."

Of course, post-pandemic, workers and businesses may be better able to optimize which tasks get done at home and which get done in an office. Such optimization should boost the productivity benefits from the WFH option. In other words, the WFH productive possibilities are an example of how the pandemic forced businesses to invest in intangible, but presumably productive, learning. As a caveat, Emanuel and Harrington (2022) argue that, pre-pandemic, adverse selection was an important reason why we did not see more remote work; they suggest that there remain frictions that could limit the future gains. In particular, although the pandemic has reduced the stigma associated with remote work, many workers continue to perceive a promotion penalty associated with remote work. Clearly, much remains to be learned as we see how businesses and individuals adjust in the future.

Work from home is just one channel. Other channels disrupt production and TFP. Bloom, Bunn, Mizen, Smietanka, and Thwaites (2020) estimate, based on survey data from UK firms, that COVID-19 reduced the level of near- and medium-term TFP fairly substantially within firms (and on average). For example, firms reported needing to purchase additional intermediate inputs, such as cleaning services, in order to produce any level of sales. These additional expenses reduce the level of TFP. The survey evidence suggests a large, 5 percent

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**Footnotes:**

16Workers raised their output per hour by about 13 percent. One-third of that was because they were more productive per minute worked. About two-thirds was because they worked more minutes on the job—e.g., they spent less time at lunch and taking toilet breaks.

17This discussion barely touches the surface of the many rich issues involved with remote and hybrid work in the post-pandemic world—irrespective of whether a productivity boost is detectable in the aggregate data. For broad discussions see, for example, Fox (2022) and Davis (2022).
near-term fall in the level of TFP in 2020-21. On average, that decline largely, but not entirely, 
reversed over time.

More generally, firms have devoted costly time and resources to issues of health, cleaning, 
managing remote work, repatriating supply chains, and so forth. In the absence of the 
pandemic, these resources could have been devoted to direct production of final 
output—raising output relative to what was observed—or to generating ideas and innovations 
that would affect future TFP. Bloom et al. (2020) report that the CEOs they surveyed reported 
spending around 12 hours a week on average managing the effects of COVID-19 on their 
businesses. Moreover, going forward, businesses might redesign offices and stores to allow 
more social distancing, even if it is less efficient; they might also shift from a “just in time” 
inventory model to a “just in case” model, with additional inventory holdings and more robust 
(but less efficient) supply chains.

Acemoglu and Tahbaz-Salehi (2020) model how specialized supply chains may raise 
productivity but also increase fragility. Some of that fragility may have shown up as reduced 
TFP during the pandemic recovery. Consider the extreme complementarity between key 
intermediates and final output. For example, if car manufacturers can’t get a needed 
semiconductor—and the average motor vehicle contains almost 300 semiconductors—then 
they can’t produce the car. It doesn’t matter how much labor or capital or steel and glass they 
have. This lack of a key intermediate affects TFP: You may have the domestic capital and labor, 
but you still can’t produce because you can’t get the key intermediates.\footnote{Supply-chain bottlenecks need not reduce potential TFP. First, bottlenecks can reflect strong demand for particular products instead of reduced potential. Second, many bottlenecks discussed in the press involve imports of final goods. That’s a smaller issue for GDP because the goods aren’t domestically produced. Third, an important source of bottlenecks is labor shortages arising from the pandemic-induced fall in labor supply (see Section 5).}

There are a range of other potential channels that may help, or harm, TFP. Reallocations 
from sectoral shifts can also entail adjustment costs that, at least temporarily, reduce TFP. For 
example, sectors that are expanding may need to devote time and resources to meeting 
increases in demand, expanding capacity, and so forth. Perhaps surprisingly, David et al. 
(2021) find that the extent of reallocation of employment across sectors is similar to or smaller 
than previous recessions. We discuss industry sectoral shifts in Section 4.3 and also find this 
channel to be relatively small, on balance. That said, firms in contact industries could have 
incurred sizeable adjustments from the initial shift away from their industries, and then
incurred additional costs from adjusting back.

Allocation also affects the level of TFP. Many businesses have failed, and some have been formed. Depending on the relative productivity characteristics of the failing/starting firms, this could lead to “cleansing” or “sullying” (raising or lowering TFP) For U.S. manufacturing industries, Kehrig (2015) documents countercyclical productivity dispersion, contrary to a “cleansing” effect. One way to rationalize his findings is that inputs for starting a business or fixed costs are more expensive in a boom.

Given the arguments for positive versus negative effects on productivity, the results in Bloom et al. (2020) are intriguing and suggestive. They find considerable heterogeneity in productivity expectations and experience across firms. The near- and medium-term effect on firm-level TFP was more likely to be positive for firms where more of the work can be done from home, and where sales do not depend as much on face-to-face contact with customers. In contrast, for firms where it is harder to work from home and where sales do depend on face-to-face contact, firms expected more negative near and medium-term effects on TFP. These findings motivate our exploration in Section 4.3.2, where we relate pandemic productivity performance to measures of teleworkability.

To conclude this discussion, it is striking that we can even debate the sign of the pandemic shock on TFP. In many ways, the most incredible aspect of the economy in 2020 was that many businesses were able to continue to produce at all. Eberly, Haskel, and Mizen (2021) quantify that output could easily have fallen twice as much as it did during the recession if not for the ability to work from home, where workers substituted home capital for idle office capital.

4.2 Growth accounting during the pandemic

We now turn to aggregate (business-sector) productivity. We reach three main takeaways. First, the recent productivity data do not on net suggest an obviously large net positive or negative effect from the pandemic. Second, consistent with our earlier discussion of Figure 2, productivity dynamics show an accelerated version of what we saw in the Great Recession, where productivity growth was initially strong and then weak. The growth-accounting reasons are qualitatively similar, with capital deepening and labor composition contributing strongly positively early but then reversing. Third, income-side measures of growth in output, labor
productivity, and TFP have been nearly 2 pp faster at an annual rate than the tepid (or worse) expenditure-side measures. Expenditure-side data, used in the official productivity statistics, are consistent with the adverse speculative channels dominating; income-side measures are consistent with the positive channels dominating (albeit modestly). Our benchmark analysis averages these two measures of output.

Our main takeaways are actually apparent in labor productivity data alone. This matters because the widespread work-from-home shift could affect capital measurement. First, some measured capital growth was duplicative, as firms invested in IT capital (such as laptops, routers, and printers) that allowed workers to work remotely—even as workplace capital was idle. The data appendix finds that this source of mismeasurement was relatively small.\textsuperscript{19}

Second, we do not explicitly account for the substitution of home for workplace capital. Eberly, Haskel, and Mizen (2021) quantify the degree to which this substitution limited the decline in output during the pandemic recession. The ability to mobilize this “potential business capital,” which was made possible in large part by advances in telecommunications and Internet connectivity, substantially aids economic resilience. Our implicit assumption is that the utilization of home capital largely offsets having office capital idle—leaving capital in use largely consistent with what is measured.

With these caveats, Figure 4 decomposes growth in output per hour for selected periods into the contributions of TFP, capital deepening and labor composition (see equation (3)). Several periods are relatively long and correspond to the “growth regimes” shown in Figure 3. Several others, notably 2007-10, 2020, and 2021-22, correspond to only a few years. The 2020 bar corresponds to growth in the four quarters of 2020 (that is, growth from 2019Q4 through 2020Q4). The 2021-22 bar is growth in the six quarters from 2020Q4 through 2022Q2.

Our first takeaway—that the productivity data do not, on net, suggest an obviously large net positive or negative effect from the pandemic—is clear from the the two horizontal dashed lines. The thin dashed line shows average growth from 2004-2019. The thick dashed line shows the pandemic average over the 10 quarters from 2019Q4 through 2022Q2. Pandemic labor-

\textsuperscript{19} Measured capital input growth slowed only modestly during the pandemic, from an annualized growth rate of around 3 percent in 2019 to about 2.1/4 in 2020 before rebounding to 2.3/2 in 2021 and 3 percent in the first half of 2022. (By comparison, following the Great Recession, capital growth slowed by 2 to 3 percentage points for several years.) We estimate that duplicative spending on computers and other IT capital boosted the 2020 and 2021 figures by perhaps 2/10ths percent. This duplicative spending shows up in TFP. Intuitively, the same production required additional purchases of inputs of capital, reducing measured TFP relative to true technology. Our estimate of the overstatement of capital growth leads to an understatement of TFP growth of less than 1/10th percent per year.
Notes: Source is Fernald (2014). Quarterly data. Growth rates are all Q4/Q4 except for first bar (which starts, in levels, in 1973Q1) and final bar (which shows growth for the six quarters ending in 2022Q2). 2020 growth is the four quarters from 2019Q4 through 2020Q4. Thin dashed horizontal line shows average labor productivity growth in the 15 years ending in 2019Q4. Thick dashed line shows growth in the 10 pandemic quarters from 2019Q4 through 2022Q2. Capital deepening is the contribution of capital relative to composition-adjusted hours.

Productivity growth has been close to its average in the 15 years prior to the pandemic.

Of course, productivity growth has been far from smooth over the generally slow-growth period since 2004 (even abstracting from high quarter-to-quarter volatility). Notably, there were short-lived spikes around the Great Recession and its early aftermath (2007–10) as well as early in the pandemic period (2020). The pandemic spike is consistent with a general pattern that productivity rises when economic activity contracts in recessions (and early in recoveries).

This brings us to our second takeaway, that productivity dynamics show an accelerated version of what we saw in the Great Recession. This takeaway was shown clearly in Figure 2 in the introduction. That figure showed that, based on the pre-2020 relationship with unemployment changes, one would have expected an initial surge in productivity growth of roughly the magnitude actually observed in the data. Given the rapid decline in the unemployment rate, that initial surge was predicted to be followed by an outright decline (negative growth) for a period of time—again roughly consistent with the data.

In Figure 4, the surge shows up in 2020 and the decline in 2021-22. The magnitude and composition of the pandemic spike in productivity during 2020 looks remarkably similar to the
spike during and immediately after the Great Recession.\textsuperscript{20} In both cases, cyclical increases in capital deepening (light grey segments) and labor composition (dark grey segments) account for much of the productivity surge. For capital deepening, available capital (as measured) changed little, but each worker had more capital to work with. During the pandemic, much of this capital deepening reflected that industries that shrank the most, such as leisure and hospitality, are less capital-intensive than the average.

In addition, in downturns, employment of younger, less-educated workers falls more than for older, more-educated workers (e.g., Fernald and Wang, 2016), raising the average experience and education of those working. During the pandemic, this effect was accentuated by the intense contraction in output and employment for high-contact service sectors, such as restaurants and accommodations (Stewart, 2022). These service sectors tend to employ workers who are younger and less educated than the average. Hence, as these sectors contracted, the average experience and education of the people who continued to work rose.

In 2021-22, the capital-deepening and labor-composition effects reversed: Indeed, both contribute negatively to growth, helping to explain the overall negative growth in labor productivity over this period. Following the Great Recession, both effects also reversed. But, reflecting the overall slow pace of recovery from the Great Recession, the reversal was more gradual. It shows up in the 2010-19 bar as a low contribution of capital deepening and labor composition to productivity growth—but not as outright negative contributions.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, the cyclical productivity dynamics during the pandemic appear accelerated relative to the Great Recession, reflecting the much more rapid rebound from the downturn.

What about TFP (the black segments in the figure)? Measured TFP grew modestly in both 2020 and in 2021-22, despite the negative labor-productivity growth in 2021-22. The 0.9 percent average pace has been somewhat faster than its 2004-19 pace of about $\frac{1}{2}$ percent.

This pandemic pace surely overstates the true pace of innovation because of cyclical

\textsuperscript{20}The Great Recession ended in 2009Q2; the pandemic recession ended in 2020Q2. The figure includes the six quarters following the end of the Great Recession and the two quarters following the end of the pandemic recession. In both cases, labor productivity growth remained very strong in those quarters. In 2020, measured TFP growth fell 18 percent in the second quarter, even as labor productivity rose 7-1/2 percent; TFP then rose 14 percent in the third quarter and 10 percent in the fourth quarter. Using all four quarters smooth the picture. The average growth rate, growth-accounting composition, and volatility of labor productivity showed a more distinct change in 2021-22.

\textsuperscript{21}We would emphasize that, because these slow cyclical dynamics following the Great Recession, it is a mistake to focus on exceptionally low pace of productivity growth from 2010-19 rather than average over the full 2004-19 period. The simple cyclical-adjustment equation used for Figure 2 suggests that the cyclical dynamics to productivity continued until 2019. Fernald, Hall, Stock, and Watson (2017) link these cyclical dynamics to the normalization of the level of capital deepening. They assume that the cyclical dynamics had largely run their course by the end of 2016. In Figure 2, labor productivity had largely returned to trend by 2016.
movements in TFP. Despite the countercyclicality of labor productivity in recent decades, measured TFP remains procyclical—rising in booms and falling in recessions. The procyclicality primarily reflects variations in the intensity with which capital and labor are used (e.g., because of labor hoarding in recessions; see Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) and Fernald and Wang (2016)). Indeed, during the first half of 2020, as the economy contracted, measured TFP plunged. But starting in the second half of 2020, as the economy began recovering, TFP rebounded strongly. During the recovery, these patterns plausibly reflect variations in factor utilization, which raise measured TFP because they are not controlled for in standard TFP.

The factor-utilization measure in Fernald (2014) (which, in turn, is based on Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) (BFK)) provides a quantitative estimate of the contribution of factor utilization to measured TFP growth. The BFK measure is based on the idea that observed variation in hours per worker provides an intensive-margin proxy for unobserved variation in the intensity of labor effort (and, with some additional theory, for unobserved variation in capital's workweek as well). In 2020, rising factor utilization accounts for almost all of the measured TFP growth of 0.9 percent. In 2021-22, rising factor utilization accounts for one-third of the average measured TFP growth of 0.9 percent. (In earlier time periods shown in Figure 4, the utilization adjustment was small, which is why we do not emphasize it.) Thus, with the Fernald/BFK measure, utilization-adjusted TFP growth has averaged about 0.4 percent—a shade below its 2004-19 (or 2010-19) pace. Thus, the TFP data—with or without a utilization adjustment—are consistent with our first takeaway, that the pandemic productivity data are not, on net, anything to get too excited about.

The direction of the pandemic utilization adjustment appears consistent with economic logic, anecdotes, and other observable indicators of factor intensity. For example, throughout the pandemic recovery, firms have increasingly reported challenges hiring enough workers to meet demand. In this environment, meeting demand has required pushing workers to increase their effort. And official measures of capacity utilization in manufacturing rebounded relatively quickly and have reached levels not seen since the late 1990s.

There is an important data issue that bears on the strength of productivity (and TFP) growth. This is our third takeaway, which is a caveat to the first one: Income-side measures of GDP (i.e., gross domestic income, GDI) have been much stronger than expenditure-side measures of
**Figure 5:** Income-versus expenditure-side labor productivity growth

Notes: U.S. business sector output per hour. Source is Fernald (2014), based on BEA and BLS data through 2022Q2. See also notes to Figure 4.

**Figure 6:** Utilization and utilization-adjusted TFP

Notes: Source is Fernald (2014). For each bar, the contribution of utilization and utilization-adjusted TFP sums to standard TFP growth defined implicitly in equation (1). The dashed horizontal lines show standard expenditure-side TFP growth. See also notes to Figure 4.
GDP (i.e., standard GDP).\textsuperscript{22} Figure 5 shows labor productivity growth over the same periods as shown in Figure 4. For each period, the black bars use output measured from the expenditure side, whereas the light grey bars on the right show output measured from the income side. In all cases, income-side measures are deflated with the expenditure-side deflator. Over long time periods, the two measures are typically very close. But over shorter periods, the two can diverge.

The divergence is particularly pronounced since 2019Q4. Over the course of 2020, business-sector output and productivity growth were $2\ 3/4$ percentage points faster from the income side. In 2021 and the first half of 2022, the income side grew about $1\ 1/4$ percentage point faster.

The divergence in output corresponds one-for-one with a divergence in TFP since the other components on the right-hand side of equation (3) are unaffected. Figure 6 shows TFP from the expenditure and income sides separately for the pandemic period. It further decomposes TFP growth into the contribution of factor utilization and utilization-adjusted TFP. (Changes in factor utilization contribute equally to both output measures.)

In 2020, measured expenditure-side TFP growth (the horizontal dashed line on the first bar) was somewhat negative, even as measured income-side TFP growth was well above 2 percent. Because utilization (the light grey segment) is estimated to have risen over this period, estimated utilization-adjusted TFP growth (the dark grey segment) was substantially negative from the expenditure side, while still being quite strong from the income side. In 2021-22, expenditure-side utilization-adjusted TFP growth remained negative, even as the income-side measure continued to grow at a healthy pace.

The expenditure-side TFP and utilization-adjusted TFP measures, which are negative during the pandemic period, suggest that the adverse speculative effects discussed in section 4.1 have dominated. In contrast, the income-side measures have been healthier, suggesting a modestly positive pandemic effect. In the absence of more evidence on the relative reliability of the two sides of the accounts, our benchmark remains to average the two. This average, as noted, suggests that productivity during the pandemic has, on balance, been fairly similar to the pre-pandemic period.

\textsuperscript{22}Both are GDP, one measured from the income side, the other from the expenditure side. (A third measure is from the product or value-added side, but the BEA benchmarks those data to the expenditure side.) Nalewaik (2010) argues that the income-side better captures turning points in the economy. Rassier (2012) discusses source data and why the BEA considers the expenditure-side data more accurate. Both authors agree that a weighted average is more informative than either measure on its own, though the optimal weights are unclear.
4.3 Industry reallocation and labor productivity

Even if the aggregate growth-accounting statistics look consistent with previous cyclical patterns—and a slow underlying trend—a lot is going on under the hood of the aggregate data. Do structural changes from the pandemic affect our interpretation of the pandemic productivity statistics or shed light on the dynamics of productivity during the pandemic? To address this issue, we now disaggregate the data by industry.

We start by confirming that, initially, the pandemic productivity burst partly reflected a reallocation of hours from industries with low levels of productivity to those with higher levels. (In the aggregate accounting, that mainly shows up in capital deepening.) But that effect reversed after mid-2020. On net, most pandemic productivity growth was within industry.

We then explore the industry patterns, motivated by Barrero et al. (2021), Bloom et al. (2020), and Gordon and Sayed (2022). Following Gordon and Sayed (2022), we aggregate industries into three groups: “work-from-home” (WFH), which had strong measured productivity growth in the pandemic; “goods” industries, which had no productivity growth; and “contact” industries, where productivity growth has been disastrous.

We can account for about 2/3 of excess pandemic productivity growth in WFH industries through rising factor utilization and hours mismeasurement associated with off-the-clock work. In contrast, we can account for none—or less than none—of the poor performance of contact and goods industries. This industry pattern is consistent with the ambiguity about level effects noted in Section 4.1. Intensive work-from-home industries are plausibly the ones that received most of the upside benefits; contact and goods industries received mainly the downside effects from, for example, additional production costs and supply-chain disruptions.

4.3.1 Reallocation in industry labor productivity data

There is no quarterly growth-accounting dataset at an industry level, so we focus on labor productivity. A caveat is that short-term movements in labor productivity have strong (and somewhat conflicting) cyclical patterns, reflecting the countercyclicality of capital deepening and labor composition along with the procyclicality of TFP. Still, they allow us to assess the
degree to which we should emphasize within-industry stories for productivity growth versus across-industry reallocations. They also reveal interesting patterns.

Our industry data start in 2006. We combine real and nominal value added for 43 private industries from the BEA’s GDP-by-industry data with all-employee aggregate weekly hours from the BLS (see Appendix Table 3). These industries cover the private nonfarm economy excluding the real estate, rental, and leasing industry, which we omit. Most value added in this industry is the service flow from owner-occupied housing, where labor productivity has little meaning.

The industry data are benchmarked to expenditure-side GDP, so productivity measures necessarily grow slowly. We index industries by \( i \). We define aggregate private GDP growth as a Tornquist index of industry value-added: Aggregate growth is nominal-share-weighted growth of industry value added. Tornquist indices closely approximate the official chained Fisher indices. Thus:

\[
\Delta \ln Y = \sum_i w_i \Delta \ln Y_i. \tag{5}
\]

The weights, \( w_i \), are the nominal value-added shares, \( P_iY_i/PY \), averaged over periods \( t \) and \( t-1 \). Similarly, we take hours growth as a Tornquist index of hours across industries. If \( s_i \) is the share of hours worked in industry \( i \), \( H_i/H \) (again averaged over \( t \) and \( t-1 \)), then\(^{24}\)

\[
\Delta \ln H = \sum_i s_i \Delta \ln H_i. \tag{6}
\]

We can now write aggregate labor productivity growth as a (nominal) GDP-weighted average of industry labor productivity growth rates plus a “reallocation” term:

\[
\Delta \ln Y - \Delta \ln H = \sum_i w_i (\Delta \ln Y_i - \Delta \ln H_i) + \sum_i (w_i - s_i) \Delta \ln H_i. \tag{7}
\]

The reallocation term (the second term on the right-hand-side of (7)) depends on the covariance of industry hours growth with the relative weights. The term is positive if hours shift towards industries where the value-added weight is higher, which corresponds to sectors with higher-than-average nominal labor productivity. To see this, we ignore the

\(^{24}\)The Tornquist closely approximates growth in the arithmetic sum of private-economy hours, \( \sum_i H_i \). The mean and standard deviation of the error are less than 1/100th of a basis point.
period-averaging of the shares and write the reallocation term as:

$$\sum_i \left( \frac{P_i Y_i}{P_Y} - \frac{H_i}{H} \right) \Delta \ln H_i = \sum_i \left( \frac{H_i}{H} \right) \left( \frac{P_i Y_i/H_i}{P_Y/H} - 1 \right) \Delta \ln H_i,$$

(8)

The primary reason for differences in nominal value-added productivity is differences in capital intensity. For example, capital-intensive mining has high nominal productivity relative to less capital intensive restaurants (see Appendix Table 3). (Differences in factor prices or (pure) economic profits can also play a role but do not explain the magnitudes.) It is straightforward to show that aggregate capital deepening, from equation (3), has the same form (7): It is a nominal GDP-weighted average of within-industry capital deepening, plus the same reallocation term—the second term on the right-hand side of equation (7). Thus, aggregate capital deepening occurs if within-industry capital-deepening increases, or if there is a shift towards high-capital-intensity sectors.

### 4.3.2 Industry results

Table 1 shows the industry decomposition from equation (7). Columns (1) and (2) show the aggregate growth rates of real GDP and hours calculated from industry data. Column (3) is labor-productivity growth defined as the difference between the first two columns. Pandemic-era output per hour growth (row 2 of column (3)) is lower than that in Figure 4, mainly because output corresponds to the slower-growing expenditure-side measure.\(^{25}\)

In the industry data, labor productivity over the entire pandemic period grew at a similar pace to the pre-pandemic average (column (3), row 1 vs row 2). Consistent with the pattern in Figures 2 and 4, labor productivity grew faster in 2020 (as labor inputs shrank sharply relative to output); hours and output recovered at a similar pace since the start of 2021.

Columns (4) and (5) decompose productivity growth into the within-industry and reallocation terms in equation (7). Cross industry reallocation played a small role for both the pre-pandemic and pandemic periods (see rows 1 and 2). Consistent with observations such as Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, Straub, and Werning (2021), reallocation played a quantitatively

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\(^{25}\)There are other data-source and coverage differences as well. For example, the industry data include nonprofits, which are excluded from the business sector labor-productivity aggregates. The industry hours series excludes the self-employed, and is hours paid rather than hours worked. In addition, the data in Figure 4 end in the second quarter of 2022, compared with the first quarter for the industry data.
important role at the beginning of the pandemic, accounting for about half of 2020 growth in GDP per hour. But reallocation reversed in 2021–2022 such that, on net, within-industry labor productivity growth accounts for almost all aggregate growth over 2020–2022 as a whole.

Table 1: Decomposition of labor productivity growth by non-farm private industries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) GDP</th>
<th>(2) Hours</th>
<th>(3) GDP per hour</th>
<th>(4) Within industry</th>
<th>(5) Reallocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2006 – 2019</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2020 – 2022</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2020</td>
<td>-2.61</td>
<td>-5.13</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 2021 – 2022</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: GDP data come from the BEA, hours data from the BLS. Units are percent changes, or percentage point contributions, at annual rates using quarterly data over the periods shown. Column (1) is the nominal-GDP-weighted average of industry real GDP growth. (2) is the hours-weighted-average of industry hours growth. (3) is the difference between columns (1) and (2). Column (4) is the nominal-GDP-weighted average of industry real GDP per hour growth. (5) is the difference between (3) and (4). Row 1 is the average from 2006Q2 (first available data) to 2019Q4; row 2 is the average from 2019Q4 to 2022Q1 (last available data); row 3 is the average from 2019Q4 to 2020Q4 (i.e., in growth rates, the four quarters of 2020); row 4 is the average from 2020Q4 to 2022Q1.

Given the key role of within-industry productivity growth, we next seek to understand which groups of industries drove the growth patterns. In particular, we investigate whether intensive work-from-home industries performed differently from others. We consider two industry classifications: The discrete classification used in Gordon and Sayed (2022) (WFH, contact, and goods industries) and a more continuous teleworkability measure from Dingel and Neiman (2020). In Dingel and Neiman, the teleworkability of an occupation ranges between 0 and 100%. We calculate industry teleworkability using the occupational share of industry employment as weights.26

Table 2 displays productivity growth by Gordon-Sayed industry groups. Consistent with Gordon and Sayed (2022)’s results, WFH labor productivity growth was very fast during the pandemic—above a 4 percent pace. This is well above its average 2006-19 pace of $1\frac{3}{4}$ percent. In contrast, both contact and goods industries performed significantly worse in the pandemic than in the earlier period.

26 The notes to Table 2 and Appendix Table 3 show how industries map to the Gordon-Sayed classifications. Appendix Table 3 also shows the industry Dingel-Neiman teleworkability numbers.
### Table 2: GDP per hour growth for industry groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) WFH</th>
<th>(2) Contact</th>
<th>(3) Goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2006 – 2019</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2020 – 2022</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2020</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>-1.60</td>
<td>4.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 2021 – 2022</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>-1.76</td>
<td>-2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Excess pandemic growth (row 2 minus 1)</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>-1.70</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Excess growth accounted for:</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Changing factor utilization</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Off-the-clock hours mismeasurement</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Unexplained pandemic growth (5 minus 6)</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-2.33</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Dingel-Neiman teleworkable share</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Industry GDP data come from the BEA, hours data from the BLS. Units are percent changes, or percentage point contributions, at annual rates using quarterly data over the periods shown. Row 10 is average growth from 2007Q4 to 2010Q4. Row 7, changing factor utilization, is calculated from the underlying industry data in Fernald (2014). Row 8, off-the-clock hours mismeasurement, is explained in the text. Group productivity growth is the difference between Tornquist indices of output and hours. Row 11 is the hours-weighted average of industry Dingel-Neiman teleworkability. “WFH” industries are “Information; management of companies and enterprises; admin and waste management services; finance, insurance, professional scientific and technical services”. “Goods” consists of “Mining, utilities, construction, and manufacturing”. “Contact” industries are “Wholesale trade, retail trade, accommodation and food services, arts/entertainment/recreation; transportation and warehousing; other services except government.” See also notes to Table 1.

### 4.3.3 Why has productivity growth been so strong in work-from-home industries?

The strength of pandemic productivity growth in WFH industries, and the weakness elsewhere, is striking. In this section, we are able to account for some but not all of the WFH strength through factor utilization and pandemic-induced mismeasurement of hours worked. We account for none of the weakness in contact and goods industries. The industry patterns are consistent with WFH benefits accruing mainly to WFH-intensive industries, while the costs of pandemic disruptions hit contact and goods industries hard.

Figure 7 sheds light on the association between industry productivity growth and teleworkability. The vertical axis plots average pandemic productivity growth relative to its...
2006-2019 pace. The horizontal axis shows industry Dingel-Neiman teleworkability. The industry markers differentiate the three Gordon-Sayed groups. (Major industries appear fairly consistent between the Gordon-Sayed classifications and the Dingel-Neiman numbers. Several are inconsistent but, for comparability to Gordon-Sayed, we do not reclassify them.)

The dashed line shows the fitted regression line (weighted by nominal industry GDP). The slope of 0.060 (t-statistic of 2.4) is statistically and economically significant. Moving from the average Dingel-Neiman measure for contact (0.20; see line 11 of Table 2) to the average for WFH (0.61) is associated with about 2.4 percentage-point increase in labor productivity. All WFH industries shown have pandemic productivity growth above their 2006-19 pace.

This positive relationship captures any effects that are correlated with teleworkability. If the only channel were remote-work benefits, then even contact and goods industries should have benefited somewhat. Instead, these groups performed poorly. A plausible interpretation, suggested by Bloom et al. (2020), is that industries that are low on teleworkability reap fewer of the gains discussed in Section 4.1, such as learning about new ways to do business as well as direct WFH productivity gains. But these industries disproportionately bear the costs of production disruptions, supply-chain challenges, and so forth. Before discussing this hypothesis further, we quantify two alternative explanations for the industry patterns.

The first alternative explanation is cyclical factors. Cyclical adjustment is important for understanding the time profile of aggregate productivity growth. Could the same adjustments make a difference to the industry data? After all, Row 10 of Table 2 shows that during and immediately after the Great Recession, the WFH growth rate was also unusually strong, though short of its pandemic strength. The cyclical hypothesis has some challenges. For one thing, 2007-10 productivity growth was also unusually strong in contact and goods industries, in contrast to their poor pandemic pace. Perhaps more importantly, the overall cyclical position of the economy was quite different in early 2022 versus 2010: In early 2022, the unemployment rate was under 4 percent, whereas in late 2010 it was $9\frac{1}{2}$ percent.

But of course, different industries could be at different stages of the cycle; and different growth-accounting components of labor productivity (equation (3)) can also display different
**Figure 7: Industry labor productivity growth by teleworkability**

![Graph showing industry productivity growth vs teleworkability]

**Notes:** The y-axis is average annualized growth in industry real value-added per hour from 2019Q4 through 2022Q1 relative to average growth from 2006Q2 to 2019Q4. Real industry GDP data come from the BEA. All-employee hours paid come from the BLS. The x-axis is the share of employment in an industry that is teleworkable. It is an occupation-share-weighted average of the Dingel and Neiman (2020) measures of occupation teleworkability. The size of the markers represents industry nominal GDP. Industries are differentiated by groups following Gordon and Sayed (2022). The dashed line is a fitted least-squares regression line (weighted by 2019Q4 industry nominal GDP).

One salient contributor to labor productivity growth in equation (3) is TFP growth, and an important contributor to measured TFP growth discussed in Section 4.2 is variations in factor utilization (conceptually, variations in the workweek of capital and in labor effort). We found evidence earlier that TFP growth in the pandemic was boosted by rising utilization, consistent with the overwhelming anecdotal evidence of labor shortages.

Row 7 of Table 2 decomposes the aggregate Basu-Fernald-Kimball utilization adjustment from Fernald (2014) into its components by group. Although that measure, by construction, has zero mean over the full sample (the data are detrended), over any given sample period, that measure can be nonzero. Row 7 takes the pandemic average utilization change, and subtracts the average utilization change from 2006 to 2019.

That measure suggests that utilization did, indeed, contribute positively to productivity growth in the pandemic. Rising factor utilization in WFH industries can account for more than...

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27 Doing reduced-form industry regressions along the lines of Figure 2 raises challenges. The aggregate unemployment rate won't capture any differences in industry loadings between the Great Recession (when manufacturing particularly collapsed) and the pandemic (when contact industries collapsed and WFH industries surged). Using industry hours growth as a cyclical proxy is also problematic. For example, it is on both the right- and left-hand sides and quarter-to-quarter industry measurement error is likely large. Still, using reduced-form regressions on industry hours growth or the aggregate unemployment change does not change the qualitative patterns in Figure 7.
percentage point of the $2\frac{1}{4}$ percent excess productivity growth in the pandemic.

A second alternative explanation is pandemic-induced mismeasurement of hours worked. Our quarterly industry data uses establishment-survey data on all-employee hours *paid*, which can differ from hours *worked*. For salaried employees, the data assume “a standard workweek” (as defined by the human-resources person filling out the survey). This data source thus raises issues that have been exacerbated by the pandemic:

- There is no adjustment for “off-the-clock” work. Barrero, Bloom, Davis, and Meyer (2021) find that, in surveys, workers report spending a large fraction of the commuting time they save working. Based on the survey evidence, Davis (2022) suggests this source of mismeasurement could boost actual hours worked (relative to hours paid) by 0.8 percent. This would show up as a level effect on our measure of industry productivity. Over the 9 quarters of the pandemic (through 2022Q1), such a boost would raise measured aggregate productivity growth by 0.36 percentage points at an annual rate. Hours mismeasurement is inherently more pronounced in WFH industries.28

- Early in the pandemic, many workers were paid while taking leave or otherwise not working. Hence, hours paid overstated actual hours worked, so labor productivity was understated. This effect would likely be most pronounced in contact industries. That said, by 2022, this wedge between hours worked and hours paid presumably returned closer to normal (leading to an overstatement of productivity growth later in the pandemic period—when productivity growth was already weak). In other words, this channel may accentuate the strong-then-weak cyclical pattern of productivity during the pandemic without leading to an average bias over the pandemic period as a whole.

- Employee hours misses hours worked by the self-employed. Pandemic adjustments on this margin may differ across industries (we have not tried to quantify this channel).

We would note that the business-sector and total-economy hours data used earlier in this paper are, at least in principle, adjusted for all three of these issues. The hours data provided along with the BLS productivity and cost release (which are the source of hours for the Fernald (2014) growth-accounting dataset used in Section 4.2), as well as the total-economy hours series (used for Figure 3), start with the establishment-survey data on hours paid. But the data are adjusted

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28Gordon and Sayed (2022) discuss hours mismeasurement but do not quantify its contribution. In conversation, Nick Bloom suggests that the extra-working-time effect could easily be larger than the Steve Davis numbers cited here. If so, it would increase the adjustment on line 8 of Table 2.
in various ways to better measure hours actually worked.29

Line 8 attributes the Davis (2022) aggregate 0.36 percentage point (annualized rate) of hours mismeasurement (and thus, overstatement of productivity growth) to our three groups. We assume that the mismeasurement is proportional to the industry Dingel-Neiman indices (as data appendix 8.2.1 discusses, the group bias is the overall bias (0.36pp) times the ratio of the group DN index to the hours-weighted average DN index). This back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that off-the-clock hours mismeasurement can explain perhaps 7/10ths of a percent of the excess WFH pandemic productivity growth. By construction, it explains less in contact and goods industries.

Taken together, row 6 of the table suggests that we can account for a little over \( \frac{2}{3} \) of the excess pandemic productivity growth in WFH industries through rising cyclical utilization (relative to the pre-pandemic period) and rising hours mismeasurement. But these adjustments together account for none of the pandemic shortfall in goods industries. And they deepen the puzzle of the poor performance of contact industries. Line 9 shows that contact and goods industries continue to show very large adjusted shortfalls.30

Thus, our first takeaway from the industry data is that we don't see massive reallocations that change our view about the nature of pandemic productivity dynamics. But our second takeaway is that there are considerable differences across industries. These cross-industry differences are broadly consistent with a simple story. As discussed in Section 4.1, there are large potential disruptive effects on productivity from the pandemic. But these may be at least partially offset by the WFH benefits that accrued primarily to sectors with high teleworkability.

29We thank Jay Stewart, Lucy Eldridge, and Sabrina Pabilonia for helping us to understand the issues and how the official productivity statistics account for them. The main adjustments to Current Establishment Survey (CES) hours-paid data use the National Compensation Survey (NCS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). On August 8, 2022, the BLS announced that it will roll out a new methodology in November 2022 that aims to improve the mapping from hours paid to actual hours worked, including better capturing off-the-clock hours (see https://www.bls.gov/productivity/technical-notes/labor-productivity-hours-worked-method-using-ces-all-employee-hours-nov-2022.htm). The new and old methodologies have similar long-run trends but different quarter-to-quarter growth. The revised methodology shows even greater declines in hours worked in 2020 than the current methodology, but somewhat stronger growth in hours in 2021. This change will influence the official productivity data but not the industry all-employee hours-paid data we use.

30There are other sources of potential mismeasurement of inputs or output. First, unusual industry variation in labor composition could affect relative industry productivity patterns. If the within-industry share of low-education workers fell disproportionately in WFH industries, then labor composition may have risen more in WFH industries. Work from home is highly correlated with education; and with fewer people onsite, these industries may require fewer less-educated support workers. Second, the real output of many work-from-home service industries is poorly measured. It is challenging to know whether the measurement has gotten worse during the pandemic relative to other industries. Third, industries that shifted heavily to remote work may have reduced their investment in intangible knowledge (apart from the important aspect of learning new ways to do business remotely). Remote workers may have shifted their time to current production—which thereby goes up—while doing less investment in business relationships or developing new business ideas.
The industry data are benchmarked to expenditure-side output so, on balance, the net effect of the pandemic appears negative for the level of productivity. The reason is that the WFH industries, where we find a positive effect, account for only about 1/3 of GDP. (The nominal WFH GDP share was 35.2 percent before the pandemic, peaked at 37.7 percent in 2020Q3, but had retreated to 36.0 percent by 2022Q2.)

To conclude, an open question is what happens over time. Some of the disruptive effects on contact and goods industries may persist. For example, these industries may require more intermediate inputs, more distancing, or may reorganize supply chains in more robust but less efficient ways. But others may dissipate as we get further from the pandemic and as supply-chain disruptions are resolved. Thus, an optimistic possibility is that we could see positive growth effects for the next few years as some of the adverse near-term level effects unwind.

5 Level effects on potential output

We now return more explicitly to the schematic in Figure 1 and assess potential level effects on potential in the near- and longer-term. As equation (1) highlights, such effects could occur through capital, labor, or TFP.

5.1 Near-term level effects

We start with the near term. Where is the level of potential output as of mid-2022, relative to what we would have expected in the absence of the pandemic? The major near-term effect on potential has come through the shortfall of full-employment labor relative to what would have been expected in the absence of the pandemic.

We have already discussed potential near-term level channels for TFP and capital. Section 4.1 discussed ways in which the pandemic might affect the level of TFP—either up or down; Section 4.2 found that, on balance, the effects so far appear at most modest—with some uncertainty on the sign, coming from the discrepancy between the income and expenditure measures of output. (Section 4.3.2 found that the modest overall effect hides considerable heterogeneity across industry groups.) Section 4.2 (Footnote 19) discussed the role of capital. In the pandemic period, there was only a minimal effect on the path of measured business
capital growth, even after adjusting for duplicative IT capital to facilitate teleworking.

This leaves us with labor. Figure 8 shows total-economy employment, using Bureau of Labor Statistics data through 2022Q1. After growing steadily from the Great Recession through 2019, employment fell sharply during the pandemic recession. Despite a strong rebound, employment in 2022Q2 had only just recovered to its pre-pandemic peak—and was well below its pre-pandemic trend—even though the labor market, by a range of measures, appears cyclically stronger than before the pandemic. As we discuss below, the shortfall relative to pre-pandemic expectations plausibly reflects factors such as pandemic-induced retirements.

Figure 8: Total-economy employment

How large is the shortfall in the level of potential labor relative the pre-pandemic path? The Congressional Budget Office, as of 2019, expected that full-employment labor would grow at 0.53 percent from 2019 through 2022. We want to compare the pre-pandemic situation to a

Notes: BLS total-economy employment levels (SA, Mil) through 2022Q2. The dashed trend line starts at the 2019 peak and grows at 0.53 percent per year, the pace of the CBO’s January 2019 projection for 2019-22 labor force growth.

The unemployment rate in 2019Q4 was the same as it was in 2022Q2. But many other indicators look stronger. See for example, the Atlanta Fed’s labor market spider chart at https://www.atlantafed.org/chcs/labor-market-distributions or the Kansas City Fed’s labor market conditions index at https://www.kansascityfed.org/data-and-trends/labor-market-conditions-indicators.

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[^31]: The unemployment rate in 2019Q4 was the same as it was in 2022Q2. But many other indicators look stronger. See for example, the Atlanta Fed’s labor market spider chart at https://www.atlantafed.org/chcs/labor-market-distributions or the Kansas City Fed’s labor market conditions index at https://www.kansascityfed.org/data-and-trends/labor-market-conditions-indicators.
cyclically similar point in the recovery. The Kansas City Fed’s labor-market conditions index suggests the cyclical position was just short of its 2019Q4 value in the third quarter of 2021, but rose a bit above its pre-pandemic level in the fourth quarter. Conservatively, we assume that cyclical conditions at the end of 2021 were the same as their pre-pandemic peak.

If employment had grown at the CBO’s pre-pandemic potential pace of 0.53 percent from 2019Q4, then as of the end of 2021, total-economy employment would have been 2.8 percent higher than it actually was—some 4.7 million workers. Given a labor share of about 62 percent (from Fernald (2014)), the shortfall of potential output relative to pre-pandemic expectations through the missing-labor channel was about $1^{3/4}$ percent as of the first quarter of 2022.

Not surprisingly, the employment-to-population ratio tells the same story. Albert and Valletta (2022) create a non-pandemic counterfactual employment-to-population path using Census Bureau population projections. They assume an unemployment rate of 3.5 percent and that labor force participation rates for 14 age-gender groups remain at their pre-pandemic peak values. This projection yields an employment-to-population ratio of about 61 percentage points at the end of 2021—about 1.5 percentage points higher than the realized ratio. The shortfall in the employment-to-population ratio implies a 2.5 percent shortfall of employment (i.e., $1.5/61$). With a labor share of 62 percent, this implies a shortfall of $1^{1/2}$ percent to potential output as of the end of 2021.

What has held down potential labor input in the near term? One channel is very direct: Goda and Soltas (2022, p.1) report that there have been 250,000 deaths of people of working age. A second channel is early retirements. Nie and Yang (2011) report that between February 2020 to June 2021, the number of retirees rose by 3.6 million, which is 2.1 million more than the increase predicted by pre-pandemic trends. Assuming all 2.1 million workers exit the workforce permanently and that early retirement is uncorrelated with workers income and mortality rate, this channel lowers labor input in 2021 by about 1.3 percent (given that the pre-pandemic labor force was 164 million)—possibly smaller if early retirees have lower education than the typical worker (so their exit raises labor composition).

A force potentially driving excess-early retirements is health or health concerns. Goda and Soltas (2022, p.1) estimate that those who miss work because of COVID are substantiously less likely to be in the labor force a year later; they estimate that these persistent COVID effects have reduced the labor force by about half a million people. The effect is much more
pronounced for those over 65 than below 65. (Cutler (2022) estimates, based on surveys, that the long-COVID-related labor force reduction could be even larger, perhaps a million people.) In addition, many potential workers may remain more hesitant than pre-pandemic to take jobs in customer-facing roles.

This early retirement force is likely to largely resolve itself over time. Two-thirds of the 3.6 million retirees are above 67 (Nie and Yang, 2011). Many may have planned to retire in the next couple of years regardless of the pandemic.

A third channel is the pandemic closure of daycares and schools, which may have reduced the labor supply of caregivers. Lofton, Petrosky-Nadeau, and Seitelman (2021) estimate that 700,000 additional prime-age women would have returned to the workforce by the end of 2020 if mothers had the same recovery of participation as men and non-mother women. 700,000 is approximately 0.4 percent of the pre-pandemic labor force. Using similar data but different analysis method, Furman, Kearney, and Powell (2021) attribute a smaller decline in aggregate employment to childcare difficulties—half the magnitude of Lofton et al. (2021). If the estimates of Lofton et al. (2021) and Furman et al. (2021) reflect a decline in the potential employment-to-population ratio due to COVID related childcare needs and the labor composition distribution of care-takers is the same as the overall labor force, we can interpret the 0.2 to 0.4 percent as a reduction in effective labor input due to COVID related childcare needs. This effect has presumably already begun to dissipate, given vaccination rollouts for children and the re-opening of daycare centers and schools.

There are other factors that may have been important for labor markets earlier in the pandemic but are less quantitatively significant now. For example, using real time data such as weekly payroll data from ADP and customer traffic from SafeGraph, Crane, Decker, Flaaen, Hamins-Puertolas, and Kurz (2022) documents that the share of employment associated with permanent business closures was elevated during the first year of the pandemic but is now on par or smaller than that before the pandemic.

In sum, the level of potential output has fallen during the pandemic because of a shortfall of potential labor input relative to its pre-pandemic path. This shortfall in the level of potential output has, of course, contributed to inflation pressures in the economy. Given that the unusual effects of pandemic childcare needs, early retirements, and other factors are likely to wane, this source of a shortfall to the level of potential may ease over time. For these reasons, Albert and
Valletta (2022) forecast that the major shortfall they document will persist until 2024.

5.2 Longer-term level effects on capital and labor

Some level effects may persist, or even take time to appear. We highlight possible effects on capital and labor. Section 4.1 already discussed near-term and longer-term level effects on TFP.

Several channels may show up in labor input. First, it is unclear how long the effects noted above on the level of potential labor will persist. Across countries, recessions have often shown evidence of hysteresis in labor markets—people who drop out of the labor force may be slow to return. Cerra, Fatás, and Saxena (2020) review channels for hysteresis, including through labor markets, and argue that downturns have often been followed by permanent effects on the level of potential, and possibly the growth rate as well. Fernald, Hall, Stock, and Watson (2017) find little evidence of hysteresis for the United States after the Great Recession, but the evidence for other countries (and other time periods) is much more supportive of hysteresis. On the other side, the greater shift to work-from-home may make it easier for some to participate in the labor market, such as those with childcare or eldercare responsibilities (Fox, 2022).

Second, educational attainment has been severely disrupted by the pandemic. These disruptions do not affect current production, but are likely to reduce future (composition-adjusted) labor input. Fuchs-Schündeln, Krueger, Ludwig, and Popova (2020) find that prolonged school closures can reduce the lifetime educational attainment of children today. Fernald, Li, and Ochse (2021) aggregate their estimates of the decline in educational attainment at the individual level to project the effect of potential employment in the long run—beyond 2030 or so. They find that school closures will depress composition-adjusted labor input and potential output in 2045 by $\frac{1}{2}$ percentage point, when the cohorts affected by school closures reach age 29 to 35. The downward effect on the level of potential output lasts for over 70 years, until the last of the affected cohort retires. The present values of this persistent loss in the level of output is massive, even though it shows up as only a 2 basis-point per year reduction in potential growth over the next quarter century.

Several channels may lead to persistent effects on the level of capital input, though the sign of the effect is unclear. First, increased government debt may raise $r^*$ and crowd out private investment—reducing the longer-run level of capital and potential output. Second,
empirically, real interest rates tend to stay low for an extended period after pandemics (Jorda, Singh, and Taylor, 2022), possibly due to belief scarring that raises precautionary savings and labor supply. Increased precautionary saving would imply more capital growth, potentially offsetting the effect of increased government debt. (Indeed, Jorda et al. (2022) find that GDP per capital rises in the years following pandemics.)

Third, firms may increase automation to deal with uncertainties about worker availability and productivity because of the risk of future pandemics. In this case, the decline in labor input discussed previously does not necessarily translate into a decline in potential output if automation increases labor productivity through a higher capital-labor ratio. Indeed, in the Leduc and Liu (2020) model, this substitution eventually raises potential output.

Finally, there is considerable uncertainty about the degree to which home capital may substitute for business capital (Eberly, Haskel, and Mizen (2021)). The home capital that provided so much resilience during the pandemic could be used to a greater degree by businesses—much as Uber allowed home capital to be deployed to produce business transportation services—thereby relaxing some capacity constraints facing businesses.

From this perspective, there is a puzzle why measured business capital has continued to grow so robustly since 2019 despite the widespread shift to remote work. One possibility is that home capital mainly substitutes for structures, which accounts for only about 1/3 of the user-cost weight of business capital. And with widespread hybrid work, firms may need almost as much office space as they would if workers were in the office full time. For example, firms may expect workers to be in the office largely on the same days, say, Tuesday to Thursday, so office needs don’t shrink that much. And firms may need even more equipment and software, to the degree that they need to provide for workers in a wider range of locations.

6 Long run growth and COVID-19 risks

In the long run, as discussed in Section 2, growth depends primarily on TFP and demographics. We do not expect COVID-19 to substantially change demographics in a way that would lead to a substantial change in future (slow) hours growth. So we focus this section on growth in TFP and, as in equation (4), labor productivity.

As discussed in Section 3, the U.S. economy has been in a “slow productivity growth” regime
since around 2004, with GDP per hour rising at a 1.1 percent annual pace through 2019 (see Figure 3). As noted in that section, in post-war U.S. data, growth regimes have typically lasted decades (the exception is the shorter fast-growth 1995-2004 period).

Our modal projection, in the absence of the pandemic, was that slow productivity growth plus slow growth in demographics implied longer-run GDP growth of about $1 \frac{1}{2}$ percent. That corresponds to the slope of the “pre-pandemic trajectory” line in Figure 1.

Any $g^*$ estimate is inherently subject to enormous uncertainty. But we do not see a clear reason to expect COVID-19 to substantially change the growth trajectory. That is, in terms of Figure 1, we expect eventually to be on the solid “level-effect” line, even if we don’t return to the pre-pandemic level. Still, we can identify some risks to that modal growth trajectory.

In the endogenous-growth literature, long run growth reflects the creation and diffusion of ideas. Historically, the innovation channel contributed to 50% to 80% of output per person growth in the US (see Fernald and Jones (2014) and Jones (2021)). New ideas, in turn, depend on the ideas production function, which we write as:

$$\frac{dA}{A} = \beta RA^{\phi-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

where $R$ is the number of researchers or research input and $A$ is the stock of ideas. The term $dA/A$ is the flow of new ideas produced over time expressed as a rate relative to the stock of existing ideas. A higher rate of new ideas raises labor productivity growth rate in the long run. The parameter $\phi$ captures how the state of technology affects the ease of innovation. $\phi < 1$ represents ideas becoming harder to find as technology progresses.

Whether COVID affects the long run growth depends on how it affects the ideas production function (9). In an environment where ideas become harder to find over time as in Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen, and Webb (2020), on a balanced growth path with a constant growth rate of $A$, the growth rate is given by

$$\frac{dA}{A} = \frac{1}{1 - \phi} \frac{dR}{R}$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

That is, factors affecting the scale parameter $\beta$ do not affect the long run growth rate. For example, widespread telecommuting could reduce the kinds of informal interactions that spur the creation and diffusion of ideas within companies or cities.\(^{32}\) If this only lowers $\beta$, then it

\(^{32}\)Abel, Dey, and Gabe (2012) find that city productivity is related to density.
may temporarily lower the growth rate of ideas and productivity but not affect the steady state growth rate. On the other hand, it can also affect the steady state growth rate if it makes ideas harder to find and slower to diffuse (lowers $\phi$).

On an optimistic note, the ability to telecommute may open up a wider availability of specialized talent to businesses, boost $dR/R$ temporarily and generate a burst of ideas growth. The widespread adoption of video conferencing may also facilitate global idea diffusion and rate of adoption of some existing ideas. For example, Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) find empirically that increased business travel boosts growth, which they attribute to increased diffusion. With the development of COVID vaccines, business travel became feasible again. Video conferencing provides an additional and cheaper way to have frequent business interactions and hence may increase the speed of diffusion. (Of course, Brucks and Levav (2022) find that idea generation is more difficult over video. So the net effect depends on whether the easier and cheaper interactions offset the adverse effects.)

One clear risk to research effort is reduced intangible investments. Bloom et al. (2020) find a sharp decline in R&D post-COVID, on the order of 10 percent. Nevertheless, despite this survey evidence, we do not see this as a major risk yet. In U.S. data, R&D capital growth has been somewhat stronger than implied by pre-pandemic investment forecasts. Of course, many forms of intangible investment are not measured, and we don’t yet know the industry composition of the strong R&D investment.

Perhaps more importantly, Bloom et al. (2020) also find that executives reported spending about a third of their time managing COVID, which left less time for them to think about other strategic issues in the firm. The reduced intangible investment from managerial time is a real risk for the next few years. That said, this channel is likely to largely disappear as COVID-19 becomes a less salient issue for businesses.

Another interesting channel is how COVID affects the private return to innovation. The resources a business devotes to innovation ($R$) depends on the private return to the businesses. In the early 1990’s, a surge in productivity growth in IT-producing sectors and subsequent adoption by IT-using sectors led to a burst of productivity growth from mid 1990’s to mid 2000’s. Aghion, Bergeaud, Boppart, Klenow, and Li (2022) study this episode and find that the technological improvements temporarily increased productivity growth by encouraging firms to innovate and reach more markets. However, the improvements
eventually lowered long run growth because the increased presence of low-cost competitors reduced the private returns to innovation. The technology developments during the pandemic bear some resemblance to the technological change during the 1990's, in that the new technologies made it easier for firms to reach and operate in multiple markets. For example, social-distancing during the pandemic gave rise to innovation and adoption of technologies that facilitate remote working and remote shopping. As in the 1990's episode, such technological developments may be temporarily growth enhancing but may eventually lower growth by increasing competition and lowering the private returns to innovation.

7 Conclusion

The U.S. economy came into the pandemic on a slow-growth path. Despite the dislocations and discontinuities of the past few years, it seems likely to leave on a similar slow-growth path. Our modal forecast is that longer-run GDP growth prospects are little changed from the expected pre-pandemic pace of 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) to 1\(\frac{3}{4}\) percent (Fernald and Li, 2019).

But not everything is unchanged. The pandemic has left its mark on the level of potential output. We estimate that the level of potential output fell 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) to 2 percentage points as of the end of 2021, mainly through reduced labor supply. This level effect should, to a considerable degree, unwind over time. For example, there was a surge in retirements during the pandemic, presumably reflecting factors such as health concerns combined with a surge in asset prices (making retirement more affordable). Many of these retirees would have left the labor force in the next few years in any case. How quickly the level of the labor force will normalize is, of course, uncertain.

Perhaps surprisingly, aggregate labor productivity has behaved in line with pre-pandemic cyclical patterns and with little apparent net effect so far on the level of labor or total factor productivity. The cyclical pattern looks like an accelerated version of what we saw in the Great Recession, with strong growth initially and then weak growth. The growth-accounting reasons for this pattern are similar—namely, the dynamics of capital deepening and labor composition, which contributed positively early on but reversed as the economy began recovering.

There are reasons why pandemic disruptions could have either boosted or harmed productivity. These may have largely balanced out in the aggregate. But industry data suggests
that both the positive and the negative effects are large. Even after adjusting for variations in utilization and pandemic-related hours mismeasurement, industries where it is easy to work from home have grown somewhat faster than they did pre-pandemic. In contrast, industries where it is hard to work from home have performed extremely poorly. We interpret these largely as level effects, not growth rate effects. The beneficial level effects are likely to remain. We are hopeful that some of the pandemic disruptions that have weighed on the level of productivity in goods-producing and high-contact industries will ease over time.

Finally, we note that our analysis takes the current data as given. But there are important questions in this regard. Most obviously, income-side measures of output have grown much more strongly than expenditure-side measures. Future data revisions may shed light on this discrepancy. In addition, the BLS is introducing a new methodology later in 2022 to better measure off-the-clock hours (see footnote 29). Given the importance of productivity trends, we eagerly await these data revisions.

References


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### 8 Data appendix

#### 8.1 Quarterly business-sector growth accounting

Fernald (2014) describes the Fernald quarterly business-sector growth-accounting dataset used for Figure 2 and in Section 4.2. The latest version is available from https://www.frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/quarterly_tfp.xlsx. We use the version created on September 1, 2022, incorporating the second BLS productivity and cost estimate for 2022Q2 and incorporating the BEA's second release for 2022Q2. We note here just a few features of the data. Output averages the income and expenditure side measures. Capital is a Tornquist aggregate of 15 types of capital input. Thirteen of them are calculated as perpetual inventories from quarterly investment flows (basically, for different types of equipment, structures, and intellectual property), with the assumption that capital becomes productive with a one-quarter lag (so that investment in, say, the second quarter of any year becomes productive in the third quarter). Inventories are taken directly from the national accounts. Land is interpolated and extrapolated from BLS estimates. Labor composition is estimated from quarterly current population survey data and follows Aaronson and Sullivan (2001).

The basic growth-accounting relationships follow standard methods developed over many years by Dale Jorgenson and others starting with (Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967) and implemented by many national statistical agencies at an annual frequency. The utilization adjustment in the dataset follows Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) (BFK). The methodology
assumes that unobserved intensity margins of capital’s workweek and labor effort comove with the observed intensity margin of hours per worker. BFK’s estimates provide the needed coefficients that can be applied to quarterly data on hours per worker by industry and then aggregated. The hours-per-worker data are detrended to remove low-frequency movements that are unlikely to reflect cyclical effects.

BLS total economy hours and employment (used for Figure 3 and 8) are available at https://www.bls.gov/productivity/tables/total-economy-hours-employment.xlsx. We obtained these series from Haver Analytics (codes LXEHL@USECON and LXEML@USECON).

8.1.1 Capital calculations

As noted in Section 4.2, measured business capital growth, $\Delta \ln k$, could be overstated during the pandemic because of the need to purchase duplicative capital to equip remote workers. To assess the magnitude of this effect, we compare the capital data produced as of July 28, 2022—which run through the second quarter of 2022—with the the implied growth rate based on pre-pandemic investment forecasts. We use pre-pandemic investment forecasts from February 2020 by IHS/Markit forecast (formerly Macroeconomic Advisers).

From the end of 2019 through the second quarter of 2022, the average measured pandemic growth rate of capital input was 2.4 percent. This pace exactly matches what was implied by the pre-pandemic IHS/Markit forecast, suggesting no average shortfall of capital. The time profile was somewhat different, in that actual capital growth was about 3/10ths percent lower in 2020 and has been somewhat faster ever since.

By comparison, the Great Recession saw a much greater shortfall of investment and capital accumulation. From 2008-2010, the cumulative shortfall of capital input growth, relative to the average growth rate in the 2005-07 period, was about $5 \frac{1}{2}$ percent. On its own, the capital channel thus reduced potential GDP by about $1 \frac{1}{2}$ percent ($5.5 \times 0.37 \times 0.75$).

Of course, the pandemic experience is unusual in many ways, including in terms of capital. Some of the decline in business-owned capital input was obscured by the need to duplicate capital for remote workers. Businesses spent heavily to provide teleworkers with the equipment they require to do their jobs. For example, investment in computers and peripheral equipment rose 35 percent from the first quarter of 2020 through the first quarter of 2021; investment in
other information processing equipment rose 22 percent. This surge in investment translated into (share-weighted) IT capital growth of 7.4 percent over this period (lagged one quarter, since capital is assumed to become productive with a one-quarter lag). This compares with growth of only 2.3 percent implied by IHS/Markit’s pre-pandemic forecast. With a share in capital input of 9 percent, this translates into an overstatement over this period of 0.4 percentage points in the contribution of IT capital (assuming all of the additional spending was duplicative).

Of course, this was just one four-quarter period. We estimate that for all of 2020 and 2021, the overstatement of capital from duplicative IT capital was about 2/10ths percent.

8.2 Industry productivity

To create a quarterly industry dataset on value added per hour, used in Section 4.3, we combine quarterly BEA data on GDP by industry (in real and nominal terms) with BLS data on aggregate weekly hours of all employees. The hours data are available monthly back to March 2006 and are in thousands of hours at a weekly rate. GDP by industry is in millions, at an annual rate. We first convert the monthly hours data to quarterly by averaging across months of the quarter; we then convert to millions at an annual rate as \( (52 \times \text{Agg. weekly hours}/1000) \). These data were downloaded from Haver Analytics on July 8, 2022.

Table 3 displays the Gordon and Sayed (2022) classification, industry codes, nominal GDP per hour in 2019Q4 and Dingel and Neiman (2020) teleworkability measure. For Figure 7, we download the Dingel and Neiman (2020) teleworkability by occupation from https://github.com/jdingel/DingelNeiman-workathome. We merge the national measure with the employment by occupation for each industry using the BLS Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics. Then we calculate each industry’s teleworkability by taking an employment-weighted average of the DN teleworkability.

In Figure 7, we aggregate some detailed industries for clarity: mining, durable manufacturing, nondurable manufacturing, and retail. Within "information" (NAICS 511-519), we create two sub-aggregates based on teleworkability: (i) Motion picture/broadcasting/telecom (NAICS 512-517) and (ii) publishing/data processing (NAICS 511 and 518-9).
8.2.1 Allocating hours mismeasurement

Let $H_i$ and $\hat{H}_i$ denote the true and measured hours in industry group $i$. True total hours $H$ and measured total hours $\hat{H}$ are the sums of $H_i$ and $\hat{H}_i$ across industry groups, respectively. We assume $H_i = \hat{H}_i \cdot (1 + x \cdot DN_i)$ where $x$ is a constant that is the same across industries but can change over time. A higher $x$ means an increase in unmeasured hours relative to measured hours. $DN_i$ is the Dingel-Neiman measure of teleworkability that differ across industries but is fixed at the 2018 value in Dingel and Neiman (2020).

Under this framework, the change in true hours is equal to the change in the measured hours and the change in unmeasured hours due to teleworking

$$d \ln H_i = d \ln \hat{H}_i + d \ln (1 + x \cdot DN_i) \approx d \ln \hat{H}_i + (dx)DN_i.$$ 

In the aggregate

$$d \ln \frac{H}{\hat{H}} = d \ln \left(1 + x \cdot \sum_i \frac{\hat{H}_i}{H}DN_i\right) \approx (dx) \cdot \left(\sum_i \frac{\hat{H}_i}{H}DN_i\right)$$

where the last equality assumes $\sum_i \frac{\hat{H}_i}{H}DN_i$ has not changed significantly. We interpret Steve Davis’ analysis as an increase in $\frac{H}{\hat{H}}$ of 0.8% during the pandemic, which is 0.36% annualized. Hence we set $0.36\% = (dx) \cdot (\sum_i \frac{\hat{H}_i}{H}DN_i)_{2019Q4}$ to infer $dx$. Then we infer the increase in hours mismeasurement (as a percent of measured hours) in each industry group as $(dx) \cdot DN_i$.
### Table 3: Gordon-Sayed classification of industry groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gordon-Sayed group</th>
<th>Label (BEA equivalent)</th>
<th>NAICS Code</th>
<th>2019Q4 nominal GDP/ hour($)</th>
<th>Teleworkab. (Dingel-Neiman) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goods</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and Gas Extraction</td>
<td></td>
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<td>570</td>
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<td>Mining, Except Oil and Gas</td>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
<td>133</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support Activities For Mining</td>
<td></td>
<td>213</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
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<td>220</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
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<td>230</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Products</td>
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<td>321</td>
<td>47</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmetallic Mineral Products</td>
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<td>327</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Metals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fabricated Metal Products</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electrical Equipment, Appliances, and Components</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicles, Bodies and Trailers, and Parts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Manufacturing</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food and Beverage and Tobacco Products</td>
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<td>82</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile Mills and Textile Product Mills</td>
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<td>313-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apparel and Leather and Allied Products</td>
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<td>Paper Products</td>
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<td>Printing and Related Support Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
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<td>Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers</td>
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<td>Food and Beverage Stores</td>
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<td>Entertainment &amp; Recreation</td>
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<td>Accommodation &amp; Food Svcs</td>
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<td>Broadcasting and Telecommunications</td>
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<td>Administrative and Waste Management Services</td>
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