

Commentary: Economic Consequences of Income Inequality


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The empirical picture

The topic of rising income inequality is an Anglo-Saxon problem. According to World Bank data for a large sample of countries, Gini coefficients on market income have increased in the last four decades for the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand (Table 1 in the Appendix). The trend is insignificant for most of the other large industrialized countries, among them (West) Germany,^{1,2} and for some developing countries including the Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs). For France³ and Italy, two of the larger continental European countries, it is even negative. This picture is more or less confirmed by the Luxembourg Income Study for most of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Table 2). In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Gini coefficients for disposable income increased for the Anglo-Saxon countries, now also including Australia; they also rose for the Netherlands, Sweden, and Japan. For the other OECD countries, there was no significant trend. In most countries, income distribution seems to be quite persistent.

As an example of the trends in income distribution, take the earnings dispersion (for men) measured by the D9/D1 ratio, which shows a steady increase in the 1980s and the 1990s for the United States and the United Kingdom. The ratio remains constant for West Germany;

Chart 1
Earnings Dispersion in Selected Countries¹



¹Men, Ratio of upper earnings limits of the ninth decile (D9) to the first decile (D1) of employees when ranked in order of their earnings from lowest to highest.

Source: Siebert (1998) according to data from OECD (1996), Table 3.1.

in terms of the level of dispersion, the ratio of the United States is double that of West Germany (Chart 1).

Before deriving policy conclusions in terms of a more equity-oriented redistributive policy, we should be aware that the income distribution observed within a given year is only a snapshot. The snapshot dispersion does not fully capture the longer-term picture, since there is vertical mobility of individuals over time across the income distribution. Within a five-year period, there is a considerable vertical mobility in the OECD countries. Over that period, in the United Kingdom and the United States, slightly more than half of the employees move up one or more quintiles (Table 3). In Germany (46.9 percent) and France (43.2 percent) a smaller percentage moves upward. A time horizon longer than five years appears to be associated with stronger vertical mobility in the United States (Addison, 1997).

For low-paid workers below 65 percent of median earnings, mobility across the income distribution varies considerably among OECD countries. More than half of them are in a higher earning status after five years: in Italy, 69.8 percent; Denmark, 68.3 percent; the United Kingdom, 52.9 percent; and France, 50.2 percent, in contrast to Germany at 44 percent and the United States at 26.9 percent. In some countries, a large proportion of low-paid workers leave full-time employment—40.5 percent in Germany and 39.2 percent in the United States. In general, a low share of low-paid workers in total employment (10 percent in Italy and 11 percent in France, compared to 27.5 percent in the United States) seems to be associated with a high vertical mobility (Table 4 and OECD, 1996a, Table 3.9). However, this finding may be somewhat deceptive, since lower wage dispersion means, by definition, a smaller proportion of low-paid workers, and so their greater mobility is occurring across a more compressed income distribution.⁴

Taking vertical mobility in the earning dispersion into account, an unequal earnings distribution in a specific year gives less cause for concern.

Income inequality and growth

One aspect of income inequality is its relationship with economic growth and development. This relationship has been studied in two different directions. The traditional line of research is how growth and development affect income distribution. At the core of this debate was the Kuznetz hypothesis (1955) that inequality rises in the process of economic development and then falls again (inverted u-curve). The more recent empirical evidence tends to reject this hypothesis (Bruno and others, 1996). In quite a few countries with spectacular growth rates in the last decades (Japan and the NICs), the income distribution has been quite persistent.

The more recent line of research interest is how inequality affects economic growth or to what extent some amount of equality is a necessary precondition for growth. There are three mechanisms working toward a negative impact of inequality on growth:

According to the political-economic approach, (Alesina and Rodrick, 1994 and Bertola, 1993), the median voter prefers a higher level of government expenditure and of taxation, the more the median is below the mean, that is, the more skewed the income distribution is in disfavor of the lower income groups. A higher level of taxation, however, reduces investment and effort. A more unequal income distribution, therefore, should be associated with lower growth rates.

Another approach stresses political stability as an intervening variable between income distribution and growth (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Benabou, 1996; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996). It is argued that in highly heterogeneous and polarized societies, interest groups tend to engage in group-specific rent-seeking or that under such conditions, violence and overthrows of governments are likely. Rent-seeking leads to political control of the economy by specific groups, to closed markets, cartelization, and a general loss in efficiency. The overthrowing of governments creates political and economic uncertainty including uncertainty on property rights (risk of expropriation and a change of taxation), which is detrimental to investment. Both effects cement the unequal income distribution and a low increase in economic well-being (path dependence and hysteresis).

A more unequal income distribution makes it harder for the poorer part of the population to invest in their human capital, and this will weaken growth. Groups of the population may get trapped in their low human capital (hysteresis). Capital markets cannot overcome this trap because information on future income growth due to human capital formation is not available (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Benabou, 1996).

Against this negative impact of an unequal income distribution on economic growth, we have to consider a positive mechanism, that is, the hypothesis that a more unequal income distribution is instrumental in a Schumpeterian sense to bring about a higher level of entrepreneurial effort, work effort, and a higher level of capital accumulation financed by higher savings.⁵ Thus taking all arguments together, from a theoretical point of view, the sign of the relationship between inequality and growth is not determined.

Nevertheless, it seems that in a *Gedankenexperiment* we can indicate some limits where an increase in inequality will start to have a negative impact on growth. When inequality leads to instability of a society, it is hard to conceive that this would be beneficial for growth.

Most empirical studies estimating reduced-form equations where income distribution enters a neoclassical growth equation as an additional explanatory variable obtain a positive relationship between equity and growth (for example, Bourguignon, 1996; Perotti, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). These results must, however, be taken with a grain of salt because the distribution data used are of questionable quality (Deininger and Squire, 1996). Preliminary estimates by Deininger and Squire with the more reliable World Bank data show an insignificant coefficient of the distribution variable when regional dummies are included. More empirical research is needed to achieve firm conclusions about the impact of inequality on growth.

Structural form estimates discriminating between the different transmission mechanisms from equity to growth are rare. The existing evidence clearly rejects the political economy hypothesis (Perotti, 1996), which may be due to the fact that the lobbying of interest groups dominates median voter behavior in determining the level of redistribution. There also seems to be no evidence that income inequality affects aggregate savings across countries (Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 1996). By contrast, the mechanisms emphasizing human capital formation and political instability receive some empirical support (Perotti, 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). The main problem in testing the political instability hypothesis is to construct an appropriate index of instability. Alesina and Perotti use an index based on indicators such as the number of coups, political assassinations, and the like. Their index thus fails to reflect the degree of institutional uncertainty that might prevail in weak, albeit constitutional, governments. It would be interesting to re-estimate the instability channel with an index which is more closely related to the stability of property rights such as that suggested by Barro (1996).

Income inequality, equity orientation, and unemployment

Another important aspect of income inequality is its relationship with employment and unemployment. Here Furman and Stiglitz raise stimulating questions, but I find their answers wanting and in terms of the implicit economic policy orientation, I find the answers misleading.

Furman and Stiglitz argue with a vicious circle in the old Gunnar Myrdal tradition: An increase in inequality leads to higher unemployment, and an increase in unemployment leads to more inequality. The mechanisms behind this vicious circle are the typical Stiglitz topics: information asymmetry, adverse selection, poor information networks, agency problems, liquidity constraints enriched with stigma effects of long-term unemployment, and marginalization. With an appropriate model you have all the arguments of government failure that then requires government intervention, and very quickly, you are in a Panglossian world of a paternalistic government.

Sure, marginalization and disintegration is a social phenomenon that cannot be denied. Once people lose their jobs, those with previously low labor income are exposed to a higher risk of getting marginalized. As unemployed, they will not have a chance to improve their human capital out of their own means, and they will not participate in increases in labor productivity of the economy by training on the job. Moreover, due to their social status and social environment (including housing) they are exposed to a much greater risk of social disintegration including crime. This is especially relevant if unemployment is concentrated on ethnic or other subgroups of society (adverse selection). In addition, these groups will be part of a weaker network that otherwise could be helpful in the search process for new jobs.

But in terms of economic policy, marginalization of subgroups of society is not necessarily an issue of income policy or equity policy. The first best approach is to attack it by human capital formation, by improving training on the job, by institutional approaches to training on the job such as an apprenticeship system, by introducing a vocational school system, by better schooling in general, and by

providing the adequate infrastructure and mending housing and (inner) cities. Also, it is somewhat misleading not to consider vertical mobility.

The Furman-Stiglitz approach may be relevant for some groups. But it is not the correct picture for the complete economy. Note that in their approach, the initial level of unemployment is completely independent of wage differentiation. They do not even talk about wage differentiation. They do not take into consideration that a greater earnings dispersion will allow a better matching in the labor market bringing about labor market equilibrium on the different steps of the productivity staircase of an economy. And they argue that in an environment of higher wage differentiation, the prospect of reaching a higher wage is a strong incentive for human capital formation for the individual employee, and thus for vertical mobility.

I would now like to turn the question around and look at the consequences of a redistributive policy that puts more emphasis on equity. The traditional line of reasoning is that equity considerations will mean relatively high taxation for those who can bring an economy forward in a Schumpeterian sense, thus impairing effort and investment. "The money must be carried from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket" (See Okun, 1975, p. 91). Redistribution with a tax-transfer mechanism will lead to a loss of economic dynamism and consequently, to weaker investment, lower growth, and less employment. Witness the incapability of the German political system to agree on tax reform in 1997-98, mainly for equity reasons. A more blunt reminiscence is, of course, the erosion of the equity-oriented centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe.

But my argument is more subtle. I am interested in the relationship of the welfare state and unemployment. Equity considerations enter into the incentive system of an economy in a variety of forms:

(1) A more equity-oriented society will impose less stringent conditionality conditions on the unemployed. This can be clearly seen in comparing the replacement rates and the duration of unemployment benefits of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (Table 5). In Germany, unemployment benefits of type I

(Arbeitslosengeld) is paid for one year as a rule; it goes up to 32 months for those over 45 years of age; unemployment benefits of type II (Arbeitslosenhilfe) are indefinite.

(2) Social welfare tends to be more gracious in countries that are equity-oriented. In Germany again, social welfare benefits reach 78 percent of the net wage of the lowest wage group of industry for a family (one earner, one child). This ratio has gone up from 65.7 percent in 1970 to 83.4 percent in 1995, and has then declined somewhat. The difference to a market income is not too large and can be easily bridged in the shadow economy.

(3) With unemployment benefits and social welfare benefits, the welfare state defines a lower income floor, which has an impact on employment. It specifies a reservation wage, and it thus affects search behavior of the unemployed representing an incentive not to search too intensively. The lower income floor influences the wage-bargaining behavior of trade unions and employers' associations because the unemployed are taken care of by governmental schemes. And the lower income floor defines the lower cornerstone of the wage structure and thus prevents wage differentiation for the lower steps of the productivity staircase.

(4) Even when reforming the old age pension system in the continental countries of Europe, the lower income floor shows up. Assume you want to push back the pay-as-you-go system in order to make way for a capital-funded system. You soon find a limit as the pension level of the pay-as-you-go system, which now is at 70 percent of net wage income in Germany, approaches the level of social welfare benefits for important groups of society.⁶ This not only blocks the introduction of a capital-funded system; it is taken by some as an important motive to do away with a contribution-financed pension system altogether and switch over to a tax-based system, which no longer has the positive incentive effects associated with contributions.⁷

(5) Finally, government spending of the welfare state has to be financed by taxes and social security contributions. This increases

the excess burden of taxation and reduces efficiency. Social security contributions paid by firms increase the tax wedge and weaken the demand for labor. All in all, the incentive mechanisms of an economy with a strong welfare state such as the one Germany has, represent a very complex system that severely contributes to unemployment (Figure 1).


Thus, there are opportunity costs of an equity-oriented policy approach in terms of lower employment and higher unemployment.⁸ Putting more emphasis on equity creates the agency problems that Furman and Stiglitz should really worry about. It brings a country into an institutional trap from which it is extremely hard to escape. This clearly can be observed in the continental countries in Europe.

It is difficult to strike a balance between more equity on the one hand and more efficiency, growth, and employment on the other hand. There is a range of policy issues when equity and efficiency are in conflict. But there also is a range of problems where equity and efficiency are in harmony. Thus in an evolutionary process, the competitive order is instrumental in contributing to a solution of the social question (Siebert, 1992). Moreover, equity considerations should not ignore the long-run impact of a policy approach. A snapshot equity would severely limit an improvement in the long run.⁹

It is quite understandable that people in the United States are concerned with more equity. But before you start to change the U.S. institutions, a very close look should be taken at some of the experience from the other side of the Atlantic divide, especially from the continental countries in Europe that have given strong weight to equity considerations in the past. Do not forget Mark Twain's advice: "Too much of anything is bad, but too much of good whiskey is barely enough."

Author's Note: I appreciate critical remarks from Alfred Boss and Rainer Thiele.

Figure 1
The Welfare State and Unemployment



Appendix

Table 1
Change in Market Income Inequality 1960s - 1990s
(Decadal Averages of Gini-Coefficients)

Country	Observations	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990	Trend in Gini-Coefficients ¹
United States	45	34.6	34.5	36.9	37.9	+
United Kingdom	31	25.0	24.3	27.3	32.4	+
New Zealand	11	/	31.4	34.1	/	+
Australia	10	32.0	36.7	36.2	32.5	0
Canada	23	31.6	31.6	31.5	27.5	0
Germany (West)	6	/	36.0	35.8	/	0
Netherlands	9	/	28.1	28.6	/	0
Belgium	8	36.4	42.0	29.6	35.8	0
France	7	48.0	41.6	37.8	/	-
Italy	15	/	37.4	33.4	32.2	-
Norway	7	36.8	35.3	31.0	/	-
Sweden	14	/	33.1	33.7	32.3	0
Finland	6	/	30.7	31.0	/	0
Japan	22	35.6	34.1	34.4	35.0	0
Taiwan	26	31.2	29.3	29.0	30.5	0
Singapore	6	/	39.0	40.7	/	0
Hongkong	10	47.5	41.9	41.4	45.0	0
Korea	10	31.5	36.1	35.6	/	0

¹"0" indicates no significant trend.

Source: K. Deininger and L. Squire (1996).

Table 2
Change in Disposable Income Inequality

Country	Time Interval	Change of Gini-Coefficients ¹
United States	1979–1993	+++
United Kingdom	1979–1995	++++
New Zealand	1981–1989	+
Australia	1981–1989	+
Canada	1979–1994	0
Germany (West)	1979–1990	0
Netherlands	1979–1994	+++
Belgium	1985–1992	+
France	1979–1989	0
Italy	1979–1991	—
Denmark	1981–1990	++
Norway	1979–1992	0
Sweden	1979–1994	+++
Finland	1979–1994	0
Spain	1980–1990	0
Portugal	1980–1990	0
Ireland	1980–1987	0
Japan	1979–1993	++
Israel	1979–1992	0

¹The symbols have to be interpreted as follows:

- ++++ very large increase (>30%)
- +++ large increase (16 to 29%)
- ++ moderate increase (10 to 15%)
- + low increase (5 to 10%)
- 0 zero (–4 to +4%)
- decline (>–5%)

Source: P. Gottschalk and T.M. Smeeding (1997a, 1997b).

Table 3
Five-Year Earnings Mobility,¹ 1986–1991

	Pearson	Stayed in the	Moved one	Moved 2 or
	correlation coefficient	same quintile	quintile	more quintiles
	%	%	%	%
France	0.760	56.8	32.0	11.2
Germany	0.793	53.0	35.7	11.2
United Kingdom	0.705	48.1	36.8	15.1
United States	0.680	48.8	35.5	15.7

¹Full-time wage and salary workers.

Source: OECD (1996) Table 3.6

Table 4
Five-Year Earnings Mobility¹ of Low-Paid Workers,² 1986–1991

	Share of low-paid workers in 1986	Still below			
		No longer employed full-time	0.65 median	0.65 to 0.95 median	Above 0.95 median
France	11.0	26.2	23.2	35.4	14.8
Germany	18.7	40.5	15.5	29.7	14.3
United Kingdom	17.7	13.3	33.8	34.6	18.3
United States	27.5	39.2	33.9	17.2	9.7

¹1991 earnings status of 1986 low-paid workers.

²Defined as below 0.65 median earnings.

Source: OECD (1996) Table 3.9.

Table 5
Replacement Ratios and Duration
of Benefits in Selected Countries

	United States	United Kingdom	Germany	France
Replacement ratio in percent of previous net wage income 50–70 ^{a)}		b)	67 ^{c)} , 57 ^{d)}	43 ^{e)}
OECD average measure for the replacement ratio	14	23	43	48
Duration of benefits ^{f)}	6	6	^{c)} 12 months, up to 32 months for unemployed people above age 57 ^{d)} Indefinite	up to 60 months
Level ^{g)} of social welfare ^{h)}				
– Single person	15 ⁱ⁾	23	23	30
– Couple with two children	44 ⁱ⁾	60	63	56

a) Differences between the states.

b) Independent of previous net wage; 60 percent of net wages in the economy for a married couple with two children (aged under 5 resp. 5–10).

c) Unemployment benefit I (Arbeitslosengeld) for unemployed persons with children (60 percent otherwise).

d) Unemployment benefit II (Arbeitslosenhilfe), means-tested, for unemployed persons with children (53 percent otherwise).

e) Reduction according to the length of the period of unemployment (down to an absolute minimum of about 26 deutsche marks per day).

f) Months of unemployment.

g) Social assistance as percentage of net disposable income at average earnings (after reduction of housing costs from benefits and net wages). When housing is included, the number is higher (Siebert, 1998).

h) General assistance (United States: Food stamps, general assistance (by the states); United Kingdom: Income support; Germany: Subsistence aid (Sozialhilfe); France: Revenu Minimum d'Insertion); OECD definition.

i) Pennsylvania (Texas: 10 resp. 30 percent).

Source: OECD (1994, 1996b); Sachverständigenrat (1997).

Endnotes

¹Biewen (1998) finds a slight reduction of income inequality in West Germany for the period 1985–1996. Note that changes in the Gini coefficients are affected by the choice of the equivalence scale for household size. For instance, there is a slight increase in the Gini coefficient in 1995 according to the Bundesamt-scale and a decrease according to the OECD scale (Biewen 1998, Tables 1 and 5). Burkhauser and others (1988) show a slight increase in the Gini coefficient in the period 1994–1995 for labor earnings and in the period 1992–1996 for post-government income (Table 3).

²In East Germany inequality has risen during 1990–1996. In reunified Germany, inequality has been drastically reduced due to the growth of mean income in East Germany.

³Income distribution remained nearly constant in France according to Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995).

⁴When Shorrocks R is used to analyze the permanent part in labor income inequality or in post-government income inequality, the United States has higher levels of income inequality and a higher permanent share of post-government inequality in the 1980s and the 1990s than Germany (Burkhauser and others 1998). According to this analysis, income inequality in Germany is moderately increasing in the 1990s, including the permanent component of post-government income inequality.

⁵Compare the Kaldor hypothesis (1957) that the marginal propensity to save of the rich is much higher than that of the poor which implies a positive impact of inequality on aggregate savings.

⁶Relative to the standard pension in West Germany, social welfare payments reach 62.6 percent (social assistance including housing, see table). This means that for some groups receiving less than the standard pension (because of a lower earning profile or less than 45 years of working life) reducing contribution-financed old age pensions (actually at 70 percent of net wage) in order to make room for a capital-funded system comes close to the level of social welfare payments.

Table
Standard Pension and Social Assistance for the Elderly in West Germany in 1998

	Single person ^{a)}	Couple ^{a),b)}
Standard pension ^{c)}		
– DM per month	1,977	1,977 ^{d)}
Social assistance ^{e)} including housing costs		
– DM per month	1,237	2,022
– percent of standard pension	62.6	102.3

a)Aged 65 or more.

b)One income earner.

c)Working career of 45 years, average wage income, net of tax.

d)Potential benefits (for example, means-tested social assistance) neglected.

e)Including irregular transfers of 81 DM (singles) resp. 145 DM (couple).

Source: Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger, own calculations.

⁷Another example is the need for wage differentiation. Here, it becomes more acceptable for some to require a wage subsidy for the lower segments of the labor market.

⁸An empirical analysis on the impact of the welfare state on employment is extremely difficult. An index of the welfare state would have to be confronted with unemployment rates. Such an index would have to comprise the set of potential causes of unemployment. Determining the weights of the components of such an index (lacking wage differentiation, duration of benefits, replacement ratios, level of welfare payments, layoff restraints, and so forth) would presuppose knowing the relevance of different determinants of unemployment. Besides, international comparisons are difficult. Thus, one has to rely on tracing the institutional changes of individual countries over time and looking at their impact (Siebert 1997). There is new evidence, however, that for the OECD countries there is a negative relation between the level of government expenditure (in percent of GDP) and the creation of jobs (Heitger 1998); the higher the level of expenditure, the lower the rate of increase of jobs. This especially holds for consumptive government expenditures; investive governmental expenditures have a positive effect on employment.

⁹Ethical norms should be judged in a general equilibrium including all ramifications in the economy.

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