New Methods for Savings and Loans To Hedge Interest Rate Risk

By Charles S. Morris and Thomas J. Merfeld

The savings and loan industry has experienced severe problems in recent years. Profit rates have fallen substantially from the high levels of the late 1970s and failures have risen. Profits also have been highly variable in recent years. While the variability in profit rates can be attributed to many factors, one of the most important factors has been the variability in interest rates. For example, interest rates rose sharply in the early 1980s and then declined, while savings and loan profit rates fell sharply and then rose. Changes in interest rates had such strong effects on the profitability of savings and loans because their portfolios, which consisted primarily of long-term fixed-rate mortgages funded by short-term liabilities, were exposed to a high degree of interest rate risk.

As interest rates rose and profits declined, many savings and loans reduced their exposure to changes in interest rates by restructuring their asset and liability portfolios. For example, some savings and loans reduced the share of their assets in long-term fixed-rate mortgages and increased the share of their assets with variable rates, such as adjustable-rate mortgages, or with short maturities, such as commercial loans. And some savings and loans reduced their reliance on short-term deposits by switching to longer-term sources of funds. Although these balance sheet adjustments did reduce the exposure of the savings and loan industry to changes in interest rates, the industry is still substantially exposed to future swings in interest rates.

Some savings and loans have further reduced their interest rate risk by using new financial instruments to hedge against changes in interest rates. This article explains how savings and loans have used three of these hedging instruments—interest rate swaps, financial futures, and options on financial futures—to reduce interest rate risk. While providing benefits, hedging strategies are

Charles S. Morris is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Thomas J. Merfeld is an analyst in the Research Division at Franklin Savings Association, Ottawa, Kansas, and a former assistant economist at the bank. Julia Reigel, a research associate at the bank, assisted in the preparation of the article.
complex and can expose savings and loans to new risks. As a result, savings and loans must thoroughly examine all aspects of hedging techniques before deciding to implement an interest rate risk hedging program.

The first section of this article documents the variability of profits at U.S. savings and loans over the past several years and shows that there is a negative relationship between interest rates and savings and loan profit rates. The second section defines interest rate risk, shows why interest rate risk is different for savings and loans than for other types of financial institutions, and presents evidence of the current exposure of the U.S. savings and loan industry to future movements in interest rates. The third section defines hedging and discusses how interest rate swaps, financial futures, and options on financial futures can be used to hedge interest rate risk. The final section discusses the benefits and costs of interest rate risk hedging.

Variability of S&L profits

The profitability of U.S. savings and loans (S&L's) has been extremely variable in recent years. Chart 1 shows the variability of S&L profit rates since 1977, as measured by return on assets (ROA). After reaching a high of about 0.8 percent in 1978, the average ROA of S&L's fell more than 150 basis points to about -0.7 percent in 1981. Thus, within a span of three short years, the U.S. S&L industry went from being an industry with high profits to one with high losses. Profits did return to the industry in 1983, although they were well below the levels of the late 1970s. Since 1983, profit rates have continued to fall, and in 1986 the industry once again had net losses.

Although S&L profits can vary for several reasons, one reason often cited for the high variability in profits in recent years has been interest rate variability. Like S&L profits, interest rates have been highly variable in recent years, and
interest rates and S&L profits have tended to move in opposite directions for most of the period from 1977 to 1986. Chart 2 shows the relationship between the 10-year Treasury bond rate and the ROA of the S&L industry from 1977 to 1986. For example, from 1977 to 1981 interest rates rose 6.5 percentage points and S&L profits fell 1.5 percentage points, while from 1981 to 1983 interest rates fell 2.8 percentage points and S&L profits rose 1.0 percentage points.¹

¹ The correlation coefficient between the S&L industry's ROA and the 10-year Treasury note rate over the 1977-86 period is −0.75, and it is statistically significant at the 2 percent level. A close examination of Chart 2 suggests that the correlation has weakened in the last two years. For example, in 1986, both interest rates and profit rates fell. One explanation for the weaker correlation is that the benefits of falling interest rates on industry profits have been masked by large losses at some S&L's. For example, losses have risen and profits have fallen at some S&L's in the last two years because of rising losses on loans and real estate dependent on depressed sectors of the economy, such as commercial real estate, agriculture, and energy. Another reason often cited for declining profits in the last two years is poor management at some S&L's.

**Interest rate risk at savings and loans**

The negative relationship between S&L profits and interest rates suggests that S&L's have been highly exposed to interest rate risk. The nature of interest rate risk at S&L's, however, is different from that at other types of financial institutions because of the prepayment option of fixed-rate mortgages—assets which are much more sensitive to changes in interest rates than any other asset held by the typical S&L. Thus, in order to understand how S&L's can hedge interest rate risk, it is first necessary to understand the nature of interest rate risk of fixed-rate mortgages.

**The nature of S&L interest rate risk**

Interest rate risk is the risk that changes in interest rates will change the market value of an institution's net worth. The market value of an
institution's net worth is the difference between
the market value of its assets and the market value
of its liabilities. The market value of an asset or
liability is the present value of the stream of
payments provided by the asset or liability. Presen-
tive value is:

\[
PV = \frac{C_1}{1+R} + \frac{C_2}{(1+R)^2} + \frac{C_3}{(1+R)^3} + \ldots + \frac{C_T}{(1+R)^T} + \frac{P_T}{(1+R)^T}
\]

where \( C_i \) is the periodic coupon payment made
at the end of period \( i \), \( P \) is the principal payment
made at the end of the last period, \( R \) is the market
rate of interest, and \( T \) is the number of periodic
payments. In this formula, for given principal
and coupon payments, the market value of the
asset or liability varies inversely with changes in
the rate of interest.

Generally speaking, the interest rate risk of an
institution depends on the relative interest rate
sensitivity of the market value of its assets and
liabilities. The interest rate risk of a typical S&L,
however, depends primarily on the interest rate
risk of its asset portfolio because the market value
of its liabilities is not highly sensitive to changes
in interest rates. When interest rates change, the
market value of assets and liabilities with long
maturities changes more than the market value
of assets and liabilities with short maturities. The
value of a typical S&L's liabilities is not very sen-
sitive to changes in interest rates because most
of its liabilities are short term. On the other hand,
most of a typical S&L's assets are long-term
fixed-rate assets, and therefore their values are
very sensitive to changes in interest rates. Because
the value of fixed-rate mortgages is much more
sensitive to changes in interest rates than any other
asset held by the typical S&L, the interest rate
risk of an S&L is best understood by understand-
ing how changes in interest rates affect the value
of fixed-rate mortgages.

Fixed-rate mortgages are different from most
other securities because borrowers have the option
of repaying the balance of the principal without
penalty any time during the life of the mortgage.
The payment stream specified in a typical fixed-
rate mortgage contract is a constant monthly pay-
ment over the life of the mortgage. Borrowers
usually exercise the option of prepaying their
loans, however, so that the actual payment stream
is usually a constant monthly payment for a period
less than the life of the mortgage followed by a
lump-sum payment of the remaining principal.

The actual payment stream of a fixed-rate mort-
gage looks like that of a typical fixed-income
security such as a Treasury bond. The interest
rate risk of fixed-rate mortgages, however, is
more complicated than that of fixed-income
securities such as Treasury bonds because prepay-
ments, and therefore the length of the payment
stream, are uncertain and change when interest
rates change. The prepayment option makes it
conceptually useful to separate the effect of inter-
est rate movements on the market value of mort-
gages into two components: a fixed-income effect
and a prepayment effect.

---

2 For simplicity of exposition, expected future interest rates are
assumed to equal the current interest rate in the present value
formula. Otherwise, it would be necessary to put a period
subscript on each interest rate in the formula.

3 For example, if the interest rate is 10 percent, the present value
of a $100 10-year bond that pays a $10 coupon every year is
$100, and the present value of a $100 1-year bond that pays a
$10 coupon is $100. If the interest rate rises to 12 percent, the
present value of the 10-year bond falls $11.30 to $88.70, while
the present value of the 1-year bond falls only $1.77 to $98.23.

4 For example, the monthly payment on a $100,000 30-year
fixed-rate mortgage with a 10 percent annual rate of interest is
$877.57. In terms of the present value formula, \( C \) equals $877.57
every period. \( P \) equals 0, \( R \) equals 10/12, and \( T \) equals 360.
If the mortgage was paid off after ten years, the remaining
principal would be $90,938.35. Thus, the actual payment stream
of the mortgage would not be the constant stream of payments
of $877.57 a month for 30 years as specified by the contract, but,
just like any other fixed-income security, a constant stream of
$877.57 a month for ten years and a lump sum payment of
$90,938.35 after ten years. Again in terms of the present value
formula, \( C \) equals $877.57, \( P \) equals $90,938.35, and \( T \) equals
120.
The fixed-income effect is the effect of changes in interest rates on the value of a fixed-rate mortgage holding the length of the payment stream—that is prepayments—constant. In terms of the present value formula, the fixed-income effect is the effect of a change in R on the present value of a mortgage when C, P, and T do not change. Since the payment stream does not change and the interest rate is in the denominator of the present value formula, the fixed-income effect causes the market value of a mortgage to move in the opposite direction of a change in interest rates. When interest rates fall, the present value of the payment stream rises and thus the market value of the mortgage rises. When interest rates rise, the present value of the payment stream falls and the value of the mortgage falls. These are the same changes in value experienced by other fixed-income securities, such as Treasury bonds, when interest rates change.

Changes in interest rates have an additional effect on mortgage values—a prepayment effect—because prepayment rates change when interest rates change. One reason prepayment rates vary with interest rates is that home sales vary with interest rates. When interest rates fall, homeowners are more likely to move up the decision to buy a new home so that existing mortgages are paid off sooner than if interest rates had not declined. When interest rates rise, homeowners are more likely to postpone the purchase of a new home so that existing mortgages are paid off later than if interest rates had not risen. Another reason prepayment rates vary with interest rates is that homeowners can refinance their homes. Refinancing prepayments, however, occur only when interest rates fall, not when they rise. As a result, the prepayment effect is larger when interest rates fall than when they rise.

The prepayment effect modifies the fixed-income effect such that mortgages rise in value more than other fixed-income securities when interest rates rise. For example, when interest rates fall, the rate of prepayments increases and mortgages will be paid off sooner than if interest rates had not changed. Since the principal from mortgages is paid off at an earlier date than the principal from similar fixed-income securities that cannot be prepaid, the principal from mortgages has to be reinvested at the new and lower interest rate at an earlier date than the principal from fixed-income securities. As a result, the value of the mortgage does not increase as much as a fixed-income security that does not prepay, such as a Treasury security.

In contrast, when interest rates rise, the rate of prepayments decreases and mortgages will be paid off at a date later than if interest rates had not changed. In this case, the principal from mortgages is paid off at a later date than the principal from similar fixed-income securities that do not have a prepayment option. The principal from the mortgages, therefore, will not be reinvested at the new and higher interest rate until a later date than the principal from fixed-income securities. As a result, the value of the mortgage decreases more than a fixed-income security that does not prepay.

5 The discussion of the prepayment effect assumes that the current interest rate equals the mortgage coupon rate. If the current interest rate is greater than the mortgage coupon rate, mortgages would rise in value more than fixed-income securities when interest rates fall, and they would fall in value more than fixed-income securities when interest rates rise. If the current interest rate is less than the mortgage coupon rate, mortgages would rise in value less than fixed-income securities when interest rates fall, and they would fall in value less than fixed-income securities when interest rates rise.

6 In terms of the present value formula, the prepayment effect is the effect of a change in T on the present value of a mortgage given the change in R. The explanation of the prepayment effect is in terms of income flows rather than in terms of the effect of a change in T on the present value of a mortgage. Although the prepayment effect can be explained in terms of the effect of a change in T on present value, the discussion in this article is in terms of income flows because it is a more natural explanation of how changes in prepayment rates affect mortgage values.
The relative sizes of the prepayment and fixed-income effects depend on the size of the change in interest rates. The prepayment effect is relatively small for small changes in interest rates, say, plus-or-minus 100 to 150 basis points. One reason for this is that a small change in interest rates has only a small effect on home sales. Another reason is that refinancings will not increase much when interest rates fall if the decline in interest rates is not large enough to offset the refinancing fees. When the change in interest rates is large, however, the prepayment effect can be substantial, especially when interest rates fall. The prepayment effect is larger for a large decrease in interest rates than for an equally large increase in interest rates because refinancings rise sharply when interest rates fall by large amounts but do not change when interest rates rise by large amounts.\(^7\)

**The exposure of the S&L industry to interest rate risk**

The S&L industry’s balance sheet gives an idea of the industry’s exposure to interest rate risk. Table 1 presents the S&L industry’s balance sheet in 1981—the year that interest rates peaked—and Table 2 presents the industry’s balance sheet in 1987.

Table 1 shows that the U.S. S&L industry was exposed to a great deal of interest rate risk in 1981. In 1981, 78 percent of the S&L industry’s assets were mortgages. Data on the share of fixed-rate mortgages are not available. However, federally chartered S&L’s were not allowed to make adjustable-rate mortgages until 1981 and only a few states allowed state-chartered S&L’s to make adjustable-rate mortgages before 1981. Thus, most of those mortgage loans were fixed-rate mortgages—assets whose values are extremely sensitive to interest rate changes. The liabilities used to fund the assets were primarily short term. Deposits and savings accounts were 78 percent of assets, a large share of which were probably passbook accounts, and borrowed

---

\(^7\) In fact, for large changes in interest rates, the prepayment effect can overwhelm the fixed-income effect and cause the value of a mortgage to move in the same direction as interest rates. For example, from December 31, 1985 to June 30, 1986, the yield on 10-year Treasury bonds fell from 9.01 percent to 7.34 percent and the price of the 12-percent-coupon Government National Mortgage Association mortgage pass-through securities (GNMA 12s) fell from 107.13 to 105.75.

---

**Table 1**

**Balance sheet of FSLIC-insured savings and loans, December 1981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Percent of assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage loans(^*)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmortgage loans</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity portfolio</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed assets</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liabilities</th>
<th>Percent of assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deposits and savings accounts</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowed money</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due in 1 year or less</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due in 1 year or more†</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other liabilities</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net worth</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\)Includes pass-through securities

†Includes mortgages on association premises, subordinated debentures, and mortgage-backed bond issues

*Source: Quarterly Thrift Financial Aggregates, Federal Home Loan Bank Board*
money due in one year or less was 8 percent of assets. Since the value of short-term liabilities is relatively insensitive to changes in interest rates, it should be of no surprise that S&L profits declined as interest rates rose in 1980 and 1981.

Comparing Table 2 with Table 1 clearly shows that many S&L's have restructured their balance sheets in recent years and reduced interest rate risk. They have reduced the sensitivity of their net worth to changes in interest rates by making their asset portfolios less sensitive to changes in interest rates and their liability portfolios more sensitive. For example, the sensitivity of assets to changes in interest rates has fallen as the share of assets in adjustable-rate mortgages has increased from essentially nothing in 1981 to 31 percent in 1987. And many S&L's have chosen to rely more heavily on longer-term borrowings, such as Federal Home Loan Bank advances, which have increased the sensitivity of liabilities to changes in interest rates.\(^8\) As a result of these portfolio changes, future increases in interest rates will be less detrimental to the net worth of S&L's than in the past because the value of assets will fall by less and the value of liabilities will fall by more than they would have in previous years.\(^9\)

Although the S&L industry has reduced its exposure to changes in interest rates by restructuring its balance sheet, Table 2 also suggests that the industry is still exposed to substantial interest rate risk. In 1987, fixed-rate mortgages were 39 percent of assets and still the largest category of industry assets. On the other hand, variable-rate deposits, deposits with maturities of less than

\[\text{TABLE 2} \]
Balance sheet of FSLIC-insured savings and loans, June 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent of assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage loans*</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustable rate or balloon</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed rate</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmortgage loans</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity portfolio</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed assets</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other assets</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liabilities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deposits and savings accounts</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOW, MMDA, and passbook accounts</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-maturity (1 year or less)(^\dagger)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-maturity (1 to 3 years)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-maturity (over 3 years)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowed money</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHLB advances</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other borrowed money</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other liabilities</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net worth</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes pass-through securities
\(^\dagger\)Includes fixed-maturity and variable-rate accounts

Source: Quarterly Thrift Financial Aggregates, Federal Home Loan Bank Board

---

\(^8\) Although the maturity distribution of Federal Home Loan Bank advances is not reported, most Federal Home Loan Bank advances have a maturity of more than one year. On the other hand, "other borrowed money," the other major category of borrowed money, is typically short term.

\(^9\) This implicitly assumes that restructuring the balance sheet does not affect any of the other risks to which S&L's are exposed, such as credit risk. The effect of restructuring the balance sheet on credit risk is discussed more fully below.

three years, and other borrowed money were still the largest sources of funds, amounting to 77 percent of assets. Moreover, although longer-term sources of funds were 23 percent of assets, the maturities of these funds are generally much
shorter than the expected lives of fixed-rate mortgages.

**New methods for hedging interest rate risk**

Not all S&L's have relied solely on balance sheet restructuring techniques to reduce interest rate risk. Some S&L's have further reduced their interest rate risk by using new financial instruments to hedge their net worth against changes in interest rates. Interest rate swaps, financial futures, and options on financial futures are three instruments that are widely available for hedging interest rate risk.

**What is interest rate risk hedging?**

In many ways, interest rate risk hedging is like buying an insurance policy that protects net worth from changes in interest rates. In an insurance contract, if a covered event occurs—a car accident, a hospital stay, or the like—the insurer compensates the insured party. In the same way, if a change in interest rates causes the value of the S&L’s net worth to change and if the appropriate hedge was chosen, the increase in the value of the hedging assets will compensate the S&L. But just as a policyholder must pay an initial premium for insurance, an S&L that hedges its net worth must pay for hedging assets.

More formally, hedging net worth against changes in interest rates is defined as taking a position in an asset—the hedging asset—such that the change in the value of the hedging asset due to a change in interest rates is equal and opposite to the change in the value of net worth due to the change in interest rates.\(^\text{10}\) Hedging reduces the sensitivity of net worth to changes in interest rates—that is, it reduces interest rate risk—because the value of the hedging asset changes just enough to offset the change in the value of net worth. It is important to realize, however, that in reducing interest rate risk, hedging not only protects net worth from declining when interest rates rise, but it also prevents net worth from rising when interest rates fall. Thus, an important difference between hedging and standard insurance contracts is that standard insurance contracts do not require the insured party to forego unexpected gains.

The intuition behind interest rate risk hedging techniques is fairly simple. First, an S&L must estimate how much its net worth changes for a given change in interest rates at the current level of interest rates. Second, it must estimate how much the value of the hedging asset changes for a given change in interest rates at the current level of interest rates.\(^\text{11}\) The S&L can then determine the position and the number of units of the hedging asset that it needs by setting the estimated change in the value of net worth equal to the estimated change in the value of the hedging asset times the number of units of the hedging asset.\(^\text{12}\)

Although the intuition behind hedging techniques is fairly simple, the implementation is quite complicated. To begin with, just as many different

---

\(^{10}\) Throughout the remainder of this article, what is meant by "a change in interest rates" is that all interest rates change by the same amount, that is, the change in the yield curve is parallel, and that the change is equal across sectors.

\(^{11}\) The hedging process described in the text is known as "macro hedging" because the interest rate risk of the S&L's overall net worth is being hedged. For regulatory and accounting purposes, however, S&L's must "micro hedge." Micro hedging involves hedging specific assets and liabilities, as opposed to the S&L's overall net worth. Although S&L's must associate hedges with specific assets or liabilities, the discussion of hedging in the text is in terms of macro hedging because the relevant issue is the effect of a hedge on net worth.

\(^{12}\) For example, if it is estimated that a 100-basis-point increase in interest rates will cause the value of an S&L to fall $1 million and the value of the hedging asset to fall $10,000, then the S&L could hedge its net worth by selling 100 units of the hedging asset.
forms of insurance can be purchased to cover a given contingency—such as term, whole, or universal life policies—S&L’s can choose from a wide array of hedging assets. Hedges are generally formed using many of the available hedging assets, but the choice of which hedging assets to use is a very difficult problem. S&L’s must try to choose the mix of those hedging assets that reduces interest rate risk at the lowest cost. The choice is complicated further because the best hedge for a small change in interest rates might not be the best hedge for a large change in interest rates. Thus, the hedge must be chosen such that it insulates the S&L from both small and large changes in interest rates. Finally, in a good hedging program, hedge positions must be reevaluated and changed frequently because changes in interest rates, the asset and liability mix, and maturity structure of the portfolio cause the interest rate sensitivity of net worth to change.

**Interest rate risk hedging instruments**

A number of hedging instruments have been developed in recent years. Interest rate swaps, financial futures, and options on financial futures are three widely available hedging instruments that S&L’s can use to hedge interest rate risk. An important difference between these three instruments is their effectiveness in hedging the fixed-income component of interest rate risk and the prepayment component.

**Interest rate swaps.** An interest rate swap is a contract in which one party—the fixed-rate payer—agrees to make a sequence of level payments to another party—the floating-rate payer—in exchange for a sequence of payments that vary with prevailing interest rates. This contract can be thought of as the exchange—that is, the “swapping”—of interest payments on some underlying fixed-rate and floating-rate loans without an exchange of the principal. The typical maturity of a swap contract is three to ten years. Interest rate swaps are a particularly inexpensive means of hedging because the fees for arranging the swap and settling and guaranteeing the agreement are fairly small.\(^{13}\)

Interest rate swaps are useful for hedging the interest rate risk of S&L’s because swaps essentially allow S&L’s to trade a variable-rate cost of funds for a fixed-rate cost of funds. S&L’s lose when interest rates rise and gain when interest rates fall because their costs of funds rise and fall with interest rates but the receipts from fixed-rate mortgages do not change. An S&L can insulate itself from changes in interest rates by becoming the fixed-rate payer and floating-rate receiver in a swap. The S&L can use the receipts from its portfolio of fixed-rate mortgages to make the fixed-rate swap payments. Since the floating-rate swap receipts vary with interest rates, the swap receipts can be used to pay the S&L’s variable-rate cost of funds. Thus, if interest rates change, the S&L’s cost of funds is, in effect, fixed because its swap payment is fixed while changes in its variable-rate swap receipts would match changes in the costs of its liabilities.\(^{14}\)

---


\(^{14}\) This discussion of how swaps can hedge interest rate risk is in terms of changes in income inflows meeting changes in interest outflows rather than in terms of the formal definition of a hedge given in the text—that is, changes in the value of the hedging asset offsetting changes in the value of net worth. The discussion in the text is in terms of income flows because it is a more natural explanation of how a swap insulates an institution from interest rate swings. There is, however, an equivalent explanation in terms of changes in asset values. In particular, suppose interest rates rise. An S&L’s net worth would decline because the market value of its assets would fall while the market value of its liabilities would not change. But the market value of the swap rises because the S&L’s variable-rate receipts rise while its payments remain the same. The rise in the swap value, therefore, offsets the fall in net worth. When interest rates fall, the market value of the S&L’s net worth rises but is offset by a decline in the value of the swap.
Swaps are a good hedge for the fixed-income component of interest rate risk but not for the prepayment component. Swap contracts, as currently constituted, cannot be terminated when interest rates fall and the mortgages that the swaps are hedging prepay. If interest rates fall, an S&L that is the fixed-rate payer in a swap will find itself committed to making a sequence of level payments that exceed the return it can earn when it relends the prepaid mortgage principal. Since the change in the prepayment component is small for small changes in interest rates, swaps are a good instrument for hedging against small changes in interest rates. But for large changes in interest rates, the prepayment component is large. Thus, the existence of the prepayment component of interest rate risk means that S&L’s cannot rely exclusively on swaps to hedge against interest rate risk.

Financial futures. Financial futures are contracts that promise the holder delivery of a specified quantity of a financial asset on a predetermined date in the future for a predetermined price. Financial futures are similar to futures contracts for other commodities such as wheat or hog bellies. The only difference is that a financial futures contract is based on a financial asset rather than a tangible commodity. There are a variety of financial futures trading on a number of different exchanges that S&L’s can use to hedge against changes in interest rates. Most hedging by S&L’s, however, is done using Treasury bond or Eurodollar futures. The maturities of financial futures range from three months to two and a half years. Like interest rate swaps, financial futures are a particularly inexpensive means of hedging. The initial downpayment (margin requirement) on a position is not only small but also earns the market rate of interest, and the fees for opening and closing a position are small.

S&L’s can use financial futures to hedge interest rate risk by taking a short position in—that is, by selling—financial futures. For example, suppose an S&L takes a short position in Treasury bond futures. When interest rates rise, the values of both Treasury bonds and mortgages fall. However, an S&L that is short Treasury bond futures benefits because the price of the Treasury bond that it has to purchase for delivery has fallen below the price at which it agreed to sell the bond. That is, the value of the S&L’s short futures position has risen. This rise in the value of the S&L’s short futures position offsets the decline in the value of its mortgage portfolio and net worth.

Like swaps, short positions in financial futures provide S&L’s with an effective hedge against the fixed-income component of interest rate risk, but they cannot hedge accurately against the prepayment component. For example, because the prepayment option is present in mortgages but

---

16 Swaps are often thought to be better than financial futures for hedging fixed-rate mortgages against changes in interest rates because the length of the swap contract—typically three to ten years—is closer to the maturity of fixed-rate mortgages than is the length of the financial futures contract. According to this argument, since the average life of a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage is in the neighborhood of ten years, a single swap contract could hedge the mortgage whereas several futures contracts would be needed over the life of the mortgage. This reasoning does not necessarily hold, however, because in a good risk management program, hedge positions should be reevaluated and changed frequently.

not in Treasury securities, mortgages increase in value less than Treasury bonds in response to a decrease in interest rates. Conversely, mortgages decrease in value more than Treasury bonds in response to an increase in interest rates. For small changes in interest rates, this difference between mortgages and Treasury securities is negligible, but for large swings in interest rates, the difference can be substantial. Since a short position in Treasury bond futures hedges a Treasury bond portfolio exactly, it cannot be an accurate hedge for a mortgage portfolio in the face of a large change in interest rates. Thus, just as with swaps, S&L’s cannot rely exclusively on financial futures to hedge against interest rate risk.

Options on financial futures. To hedge against large interest rate changes and to protect themselves from prepayment risk, S&L’s can use options. There are two basic kinds of options: call options and put options. A call option is a contract that gives its owner the right, but not the obligation, to buy a fixed amount of a specified asset at a fixed price—the strike price—at any time on or before a given date—the expiration date. A put option is a contract that gives its owner the right to sell a fixed amount of a specified asset at a fixed price at any time on or before a given date. The maturities of options on financial futures range from three to nine months. S&L’s use options in conjunction with swaps and financial futures to hedge interest rate risk because options can hedge the prepayment component of interest rate risk.18

Options are well suited to hedging the prepayment component of interest rate risk because the mortgage borrower’s option to prepay when interest rates fall is in fact a call option.19 Mortgage lenders have implicitly written call options to mortgage borrowers because the borrowers have the option to buy back—that is, prepay—their mortgages at par when interest rates fall. Since the prepayment effect is due to the implicit sale of a call option with each mortgage, mortgage lenders can offset the prepayment effect when interest rates fall by buying call options.20 Call options on financial futures are the option mortgage lenders typically use to hedge against prepayment risk. For example, if interest rates fall by a large amount, the price of options on financial futures will rise by a large amount and offset the negative effect of rising prepayment rates on mortgage values. Calculating the precise number and kind of options to combine with the swaps and financial futures in the hedging portfolio is a complicated task, but it is possible to construct such a mix that practically eliminates an institution’s interest rate risk.21

The benefits and costs of hedging

Although hedging is a very effective tool for managing interest rate risk at S&L’s, only a few S&L’s have instituted hedging programs. Whether an S&L’s management chooses to adopt

18 For a more detailed discussion of options on financial futures, see Anatoli Kupriianov, “Options on Short-Term Interest Rate Futures,” Instruments of the Money Market, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1986, pp. 193-206.

19 The discussion of how options are used to hedge the prepayment effect implicitly assumes that the initial interest rate equals the mortgage coupon rate. In addition, the discussion is in terms of a decrease in interest rates because a decrease in rates is empirically more important. The reason for this is that the effect of refinancings on prepayment rates is more important than the effect of home sales, and refinancings rise only when interest rates fall.

20 To offset the prepayment effect when interest rates rise above the mortgage coupon rate, mortgage lenders must buy put options.

a hedging strategy for managing interest rate risk depends on its evaluation of the relative benefits and costs of hedging.

The benefits of hedging

One advantage of hedging over balance sheet restructuring is that positions in hedging assets can be taken almost instantaneously, whereas it may take several months or longer to restructure a balance sheet. The ability to change hedging positions quickly is important because the interest rate sensitivity of an S&L's net worth changes frequently with changes in interest rates, the S&L's asset and liability mix, and the maturity structure of the S&L's portfolio.

A second advantage of hedging is that the transactions costs of forming a hedge are relatively low. On the other hand, the costs of restructuring the liability side of the balance sheet toward longer-term funding sources can be quite large. An S&L might have to spend a lot of time and pay a large premium to convince its customers to switch from short-term to long-term deposits. Or if it were to try to borrow in the bond market it would have to meet the Securities and Exchange Commission's disclosure requirements, pay for a credit rating, bear the cost of collateral, and pay advertising, legal, and underwriting fees.

Finally, hedging does not increase credit risk, whereas restructuring the asset side of the balance sheet toward adjustable-rate mortgages may increase credit risk. Credit risk is the risk that borrowers will not repay their loans. Adjustable-rate mortgages have more credit risk than fixed-rate mortgages because borrowers are less likely to be able to meet the higher payments of adjustable-rate mortgages in periods of rising interest rates.

The costs of hedging

The benefits of hedging interest rate risk do not come without cost. The fixed costs of setting up a hedging program can be significant. For example, new personnel must be hired to run the hedging program, and data and computer software have to be acquired to calculate correct hedging positions. Alternatively, if an S&L does not want to run a hedging program itself, it would have to hire a consulting firm to run the hedging program. In addition to these setup costs, an S&L that institutes a hedging program also exposes itself to a new type of risk called basis risk and increases its exposure to managerial risk.22

Basis risk. When an S&L uses hedging techniques to reduce interest rate risk, it in effect trades interest rate risk for basis risk. Basis risk is the risk that the actual changes in the value of net worth and the hedging assets due to a change in interest rates will differ from the expected changes. An S&L must estimate the changes in the value of its net worth and the changes in the prices of hedging assets due to a change in interest rates when it sets up a hedge. Thus, if the changes differ from what was expected, the change in the value of the hedge position will not exactly offset the change in the value of net worth.23

Basis risk arises because the effect of interest rate changes on asset and liability values is uncertain. Because of this uncertainty, the responses of the value of net worth and the prices of hedg-

---

22 Although an S&L that institutes a hedging program reduces its exposure to interest rate risk, it is still exposed to the many other risks to which all S&L's are exposed, such as liquidity risk, credit risk, and the risk that the slope of the yield curve will change. Thus, a hedged S&L still faces risks that must be managed.

23 More precisely, basis is the difference between the price of a hedging asset and the price of the asset being hedged. When interest rates change, the basis may also change. The change in basis is uncertain, however, because changes in the prices of the hedging asset and the asset being hedged are uncertain. Basis risk, then, is the risk that the actual change in basis due to a change in interest rates will differ from the expected change in basis.
ing assets can only be estimated. For example, prepayment rates on fixed-rate mortgages are uncertain so that the effect of a change in interest rates on prepayment rates, and therefore on mortgage values, can only be estimated. If prepayment rates rise more than was expected when interest rates fall, the negative effect of rising prepayments on mortgage values will be greater than expected. But, if the value of, say, an option contract does rise by the expected amount in response to falling interest rates, the prepayment effect will not be perfectly offset. On the other hand, the effect of changes in interest rates on the value of hedging assets is also uncertain. Thus, if interest rates rise and mortgage values fall as expected, the value of, say, Treasury bond futures could rise by less than expected and not fully offset the decline in mortgage values.

Although S&L’s must bear basis risk when they employ hedging strategies, basis risk is generally much less than the interest rate risk they would bear if they did not hedge. If an S&L hedges and, at the very least, is on the correct side of the hedging asset, the value of the hedging asset will at least partially offset the change in the value of net worth when interest rates change. On the other hand, if the S&L does not hedge, the decline in net worth will not be offset at all. Thus, the net change in the value of a hedged S&L will almost surely be less than the net change in the value of an unhedged S&L.

Managerial risk. An S&L also increases its exposure to managerial risk when it employs a hedging program. Broadly defined, managerial risk is the risk that management will make decisions that reduce the value of the firm and increase the probability of failure. Hedging increases managerial risk for an S&L because it is another area of business where an incorrect decision can adversely affect its market value.

Managerial risk can be contained, however, if a hedging program is properly implemented. Hedging strategies are generally quite complex, and the proper implementation of a hedging program requires that management is well informed about the complexities. Managers must understand how hedging works and what a hedging program can and cannot do. And they must continually monitor the program to make sure that the hedging assets are not used for inappropriate purposes, such as speculating on future movements in interest rates. To the extent that management understands hedging, is well informed about hedging strategies and their complexities, and monitors the situation to make sure that hedging assets are used appropriately—that is, to reduce interest rate risk—the increase in managerial risk should be small.

Conclusion

Historically, savings and loans, by their very nature, have been exposed to a substantial amount of interest rate risk. Traditionally, savings and loans primarily held long-term fixed-rate mortgages that were funded with short-term liabilities. This mismatch was never a problem in years when interest rates were stable. In recent years, however, the variability of interest rates combined with the industry’s exposure to interest rate risk has been disastrous. Most savings and loans have reduced—but not eliminated—their exposure to interest rate risk by restructuring their balance sheet. Some savings and loans have further reduced their exposure to interest rate risk by using interest rate swaps, financial futures, and options on financial futures to hedge against future changes in interest rates. Hedging strategies are complex, however, and savings and loans must thoroughly examine all aspects of hedging techniques before deciding to implement an interest rate risk hedging program.