Monetary Policy in Times of Structural Reallocation

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We characterize optimal monetary policy in response to asymmetric shocks that shift demand from one sector to another, a condition arguably faced by many economies emerging from the COVID-19 crisis. We show that the asymmetry manifests itself as an endogenous cost-push shock, breaking divine coincidence, and resulting in inflation optimally exceeding its target despite elevated unemployment. In fact, there is no simple, possibly re-weighted, inflation index that can be used as the optimal target. When labor is mobile between sectors, monetary easing can have the additional benefit of inducing faster reallocation, by producing wage increases in the expanding sector.

I. Introduction

The COVID-19 crisis has been a stark reminder that some macroeconomic shocks can have uneven effects across sectors. Uneven shocks pose important challenges to policy, given that different sectors can suffer from opposite problems: some may be experiencing insufficient demand and unemployment, while others may be subject to supply constraints, causing shortages and inflationary pressures. How should monetary policy respond to this type of situation? Is the optimal response to target economy-wide average measures of inflation and of the output gap, or do the asymmetries across sectors
require a deviation from standard recommendations, in one direction or another?

A specific issue that we address here is how monetary policy interacts with the process of sectoral reallocation. When uneven shocks have a persistent nature, a natural concern is that the economy should readjust by moving productive resources from declining sectors, that suffer from insufficient demand, toward growing sectors where demand is expanding.

In the context of the pandemic shock, Barrero, Bloom and Davis (2020) have pointed out the long-lasting reallocation forces set in motion by the pandemic. Sectors and businesses that are more able to take advantage of various forms of remote work have shown great capacity to expand, while other sectors and businesses that rely more on personal interaction may experience a long-lasting decline even after the pandemic recedes. This requires a reallocation of factors of production in favor of the growing sectors. In particular, Barrero et al. (2020) document high rates of job creation and gross hiring activity during the pandemic (see also Cajner et al. 2020), and present survey evidence that suggests that pandemic-induced shifts in work arrangements, consumer spending patterns, and business practices will not fully reverse after the pandemic.¹

A concern that can arise in this situation is that excessively easy monetary policy may hamper the reallocation process. The logic is that some businesses and some jobs that get destroyed in a recession are not going to be viable after the recession is over (Caballero and Hammour 1991). By stimulating demand in the aggregate, monetary policy ends up stimulating activity in those sectors, possibly slowing down the reallocation process. Is this concern justified? Should optimal monetary policy be less expansionary because of it?

As is well known, monetary policy must balance various goals. The macroeconomic literature on optimal monetary policy has developed insights into navigating these goals. An influential and celebrated idea provides conditions under which inflation targeting can obtain both price and employment stability—as in some situations there is no trade-off, and we have the so-called “divine coincidence.” It is well appreciated that we may have
Monetary Policy in Times of Structural Reallocation

to depart from this benchmark. This paper explores scenarios that fall quite some distance away from divine coincidence. We build a stylized model that departs from workhorse macroeconomic models in important ways, incorporating realistic features such as multiple sectors, downward wage rigidities and costly labor reallocation. We then consider a reallocation shock and study optimal monetary policy.

In more detail, our model features two sectors. Monetary policy controls aggregate demand, which determines demand for the goods of two sectors, A and B. Both sectors are subject to downward nominal wage rigidities as well as sticky prices.2 We assume the economy is in steady state and we hit it with an asymmetric preference shock, reducing the demand for sector A goods while simultaneously raising the demand for sector B goods. We then analyze the positive and normative implications for monetary policy.

We first consider the case without reallocation, that is, with no labor mobility across sectors. In that case, the asymmetric shock causes inflation in the expanding sector B and unemployment in sector A, where wages and prices are prevented from falling by the downward rigidity. This highlights that an asymmetric shock in an environment with downwardly rigid wages, operates like a cost-push shock in a textbook New-Keynesian model, simultaneously causing unemployment and inflation. This poses a well-known trade-off for monetary policy, and we show that optimal monetary policy generally allows for some inflation in excess of its target, and some unemployment above its natural level. The reason why inflation is desirable in our context is that relative prices need to adjust following the asymmetric shock and downward wage rigidities imply that a relative price adjustment is more easily achieved through inflation in the expanding sector.

We then introduce the possibility of reallocation, by allowing for costly labor mobility across sectors. In our model, the presence of nominal rigidities and unemployment affects the decision to move in two ways. Workers are induced to move from A to B either because the probability of finding a job is higher in sector B or because the real wage is higher in sector B. A more expansionary monetary policy affects these margins differently. On the one hand, by reducing unemployment in A, expansionary monetary policy
discourages reallocation. On the other hand, by promoting wage inflation in the expanding sector, expansionary policy encourages reallocation. We show two versions of our model, one in which the first effect is stronger and expansionary policy stiﬂes reallocation, and one in which the second effect dominates and expansionary policy favors reallocation.

How do these different effects inﬂuence the optimal degree of monetary accommodation? Since unemployment and inﬂation are both costly in our model, the amount of factor reallocation across sectors may be inefﬁciently low. The reason is that when workers move from sector $A$ to sector $B$, their private choice has social beneﬁts that they do not internalize: it makes it easier for other workers to ﬁnd a job in sector $A$, by reducing congestion in a demand-constrained labor market, and it eases the supply constraints in sector $B$, reducing inﬂation in that sector. This means that if easy policy discourages reallocation, it is optimal to choose a more contractionary stance, while if easy policy encourages reallocation, it is then optimal to choose a more expansionary stance. Therefore, the two versions of the model with opposite positive predictions about the effects of monetary policy on reallocation also end up having opposite normative predictions.

This paper builds on the multisector analysis in Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, Straub and Werning (2020). The objective of that paper was to investigate conditions under which output falls below potential in response to asymmetric shocks to potential output, a situation labelled a “Keynesian supply shock.” In the model of that paper, wages are downward rigid but fully ﬂexible on the upside, and there is no other cost of price adjustment, so there are no costs of inﬂation. This paper on the other hand is fully focused on the trade-offs that arise when we combine downward rigidity in wages with costly price adjustment, which makes inﬂation costly.

Our analysis is related to three strands of literature. First, our analysis builds on the study of optimal monetary policy in response to asymmetric shocks. Seminal contributions in this area include Aoki (2001), Woodford (2003) and Benigno (2004), that extend the analysis of optimal monetary policy in the standard New Keynesian framework to multisectoral models where different sectors are hit by
asymmetric shocks and, possibly, also differ in terms of their degree of price rigidity. What we have in common with those papers is the idea that monetary policy should not only be concerned with average inflation and the average output gap, but also with getting relative prices across sectors close to their frictionless level, so as to reduce inefficiencies in the composition of output. The main difference with those papers is that we build our analysis in a model with downward rigid nominal wages, which introduces non-linear Phillips curves at the sectoral level. The main implication of this difference, is that to get relative prices right it is easier to get inflation in the expanding sectors than to get deflation in the contracting sectors, imparting an inflationary bias to optimal policy.

Our work is also related to the large literature on reallocation over the business cycle, going back to Caballero et al. (1994) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1998). In particular, Caballero and Hammour (2005) discuss two potential views: a “liquidationist” view that holds that recessions are periods more favorable to reallocation, because non-viable jobs and businesses are efficiently destroyed, and a “reverse liquidationist” view that holds that booms are more favorable to reallocation, since in booms high demand helps new sectors grow. This paper makes a similar distinction in a new Keynesian framework with unemployment and nominal rigidities, and discusses forces by which a monetary easing can be damaging for reallocation—a liquidationist argument—and forces that can produce the opposite result—a reverse-liquidationist argument. We then argue that the relative importance of these forces matters for the design of optimal monetary policy. Some empirical evidence consistent with our model of a reallocation shock is in Chodorow-Reich and Wieland (2020), who show that reallocation shocks have different effects depending on the state of the business cycle: when the economy is expanding reallocation shocks appear to have no effects on unemployment, but they do increase unemployment if the economy is in recession.

Finally, our focus on the desirability for relative prices and wage changes constrained by downward rigidity relates to an older literature on structural inflation as discussed in Olivera (1964). Despite this important point of contact, there are many differences. First and
foremost, this literature did not study the optimal conduct of monetary policy, but instead assumed it to be entirely passive. Second, it did not consider costly reallocation of labor or feature unemployment, since monetary policy was assumed expansive enough. Finally, many of the structuralist sought to explain persistent inflation fueled initially by these shocks but perpetuated by indexation and the dynamics implied by adaptive expectations.

II. A Two-Sector Model with Downward Wage Rigidities

Consider an economy populated by a unit mass of infinitely-lived households with preferences represented by the utility function

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t).$$

Consumption $C_t$ is the aggregate of two goods $A$ and $B$,

$$C_t = G(C_{At}, C_{Bt}, \omega_t),$$

where $G$ is a homothetic aggregator of $C_{At}$ and $C_{Bt}$, and $\omega_t$ is a preference shock that determines the relative demand for the two goods. Each good $A$ and $B$ is the composite of a continuum of goods produced by monopolistically competitive firms

$$C_{jt} = \left( \int_0^1 \left( C_{jt}(i) \right) ^{1-\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} di \right) ^{1-\frac{1}{\varepsilon}}$$

where $C_{jt}(i)$ denotes consumption of variety $i$ in sector $j \in \{A,B\}$ and $\varepsilon > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.

The technology to produce each variety is linear,

$$Y_{jt}(i) = L_{jt}(i),$$

where $L_{jt}(i)$ is the labor input of firm $i$ in sector $j \in \{A,B\}$.

We begin in a setup with immobile labor where a fraction $N_A$ of workers are fully specialized in producing good $A$ and $N_B$ are fully specialized in good $B$. Each worker supplies a single unit of labor
to the sector of specialization. We introduce (costly) labor mobility across sectors in Section IV.

To allow for the possibility of inefficient unemployment and costly inflation, we introduce nominal rigidities in our model. We will consider different versions of nominal rigidities in the paper. In our baseline, we combine downward rigid nominal wages and costly price adjustments à la Rotemberg (1982).

Firms hire workers on the labor market at the nominal wage \( W_{jt} \). Wages are downward rigid. Letting \( L_{jt} \) denote labor demand in sector \( j \), the equilibrium conditions in the labor market in sector \( j \) are

\[
W_{jt} \geq W_{jt-1}, \quad L_{jt} \leq N_j
\]

with at least one strict inequality. If labor demand is lower than labor supply in equilibrium, sector \( j \)'s workers are rationed proportionally and the probability of finding employment for a \( j \) sector worker is

\[
\rho_{jt} = \frac{L_{jt}}{N_j} < 1.
\]

Firms are monopolistically competitive. The firm selling variety \( i \) in sector \( j \) sets its price \( P_{jt} (i) \) subject to quadratic adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982), where the cost of changing the price is given by

\[
\phi \left( \frac{P_{jt} (i) - P_{jt-1} (i)}{P_{jt-1} (i)} \right)^2 Y_{jt},
\]

where \( Y_{jt} \) is aggregate output in sector \( j \). The price adjustment cost is a real cost in terms of the final consumption good and \( \phi > 0 \) is a constant that determines the degree of price rigidity in the model.

We assume that all households are composed of \( N_A \) workers specialized in sector \( A \) and \( N_B \) workers specialized in sector \( B \), which implies that the household’s labor income is \( W_{A} L_{A} + W_{B} L_{B} \). Each household also owns a representative sample of firms in each sector and receives their profits. These assumptions imply that all the analysis can be done in terms of a representative household.
As it is commonly done, we assume that the producer of each variety i receives a proportional subsidy $\sigma = 1/(\varepsilon - 1)$, financed with a lump sum tax on the representative consumer, which corrects the monopolistic distortion in steady state.

III. Policy Options with an Asymmetric Shock

We next characterize the behavior of the economy when it is hit by an asymmetric shock. To do so, we first describe the steady state of the model and then introduce the shock.

III.i. Steady State and Shock

We assume that the economy begins in a steady state, with the taste parameter constant at some level $\bar{\omega}$, and with zero inflation and full employment in both sectors. We also assume that the labor allocation $N_A, N_B$ satisfies the condition

$$G_{CA}(N_A, N_B, \bar{\omega}) = G_{CB}(N_A, N_B, \bar{\omega}),$$

(1)

so all steady state prices are the same and can be normalized to 1. Using bars to denote steady state values, we have

$$\bar{P}_A = \bar{P}_B = \bar{W}_A = \bar{W}_B = 1.$$

This initial allocation arises endogenously in the long run when mobility across sectors is allowed, as is the case in Section IV.

At some time $t$, the economy is hit by a one time, unexpected, and permanent shock that shifts preferences in favor of good $B$, that is, $\omega_t = \omega_{t+1} = \ldots = \omega > \bar{\omega}$. What is the set of feasible allocations and inflation rates that monetary policy can implement after this shock? What is the optimal policy response?

For simplicity, assume that, from time $t + 1$ onward, the economy features perfectly flexible prices and wages. Under this assumption, we can focus on the allocation at time $t$ and on the effects of monetary policy on welfare at $t$. 

### III.ii. Equilibrium Conditions

An equilibrium allocation at time $t$ is characterized by the following three conditions. For ease of notation we drop the subscript $t$.

First, the homothetic aggregator $G$ implies that the consumer’s optimality conditions yield the relative demand function

$$\frac{Y_A}{Y_B} = f\left(\frac{P_B}{P_A}, \omega\right),$$

where $f$ is increasing in its first argument. In the initial steady state we have $f(1, \omega) = N_A/N_B$, which follows from our assumption (1). Since the preference shock $\omega_t = \omega$ shifts demand in favor of good $B$ relative to the initial steady state, we have $f(1, \omega) < N_A/N_B$.

Second, there is a price setting condition, which is identical for all producers in sector $j$ and takes the form

$$P_j(P_j - 1) = \frac{\varepsilon}{\phi} \left( \frac{W_j}{P} - \frac{P_j}{P} \right),$$

where $P$ is the consumer price index. This condition is derived from producers’ first order conditions. Its interpretation is standard: when the marginal cost of producing good $j$, which is just $W/P$, is greater than the price at which good $j$ is sold, $P_j/P$, producers have an incentive to raise nominal prices. Else, they lower prices.

Third, we have the labor market equilibrium conditions, which take the form

$$W_j \geq 1, \ Y_j \leq N_j,$$

with at least one equality.

### III.iii. Optimal Monetary Policy

Let $M$ denote total nominal spending

$$M \equiv P_A Y_A + P_B Y_B.$$

We assume that monetary policy determines $M$. It is easy to show that this is equivalent to a choice for the nominal interest rate at
date \( t \). Depending on the sector(s) in which downward rigidity is binding, the equilibrium at date \( t \) falls into one of three cases. They are distinguished by the level of \( M \) relative to two cutoffs \( M' < M'' \), which we define below.

First, if total spending is low enough, \( M > M' \), there is unemployment in both sectors, \( A \) and \( B \). Downward wage rigidity is binding in both sectors and firms keep nominal prices unchanged:

\[
P_A = P_B = W_A = W_B = 1.
\]

Relative demand is then simply \( Y_A / Y_B = f(1, \omega) \) so equilibrium output levels are

\[
Y_A = \frac{f(1, \omega) M}{1 + f(1, \omega)} \quad Y_B = \frac{1}{1 + f(1, \omega)} M.
\]

In this region, increasing \( M \) leads to higher output in both sectors and no inflation. The cutoff \( M' \) is determined by

\[
M' \equiv (1 + f(1, \omega)) N_B,
\]

since at \( M = M' \) sector \( B \) reaches full employment. By construction, sector \( A \) still has positive unemployment since \( N_A > N_B f(1, \omega) \).

At the other extreme, with high enough spending, \( M > M'' \), the equilibrium has full employment and positive inflation in both sectors. Output levels in the two sectors are \( Y_A = N_A \) and \( Y_B = N_B \) and the relative price of good \( B \) is \( P_B / P_A = p^* \), where \( p^* \) satisfies

\[
f(p^*, \omega) = \frac{N_A}{N_B}.
\]

In this region, as \( M \) increases, \( P_A \) and \( P_B \) grow proportionally, with the relative price \( P_A / P_B \) unchanged.

The most interesting case arises with intermediate levels of spending, \( M' \leq M \leq M'' \). In this case, the equilibrium features unemployment and zero inflation in sector \( A \) and full employment and inflation in sector \( B \), with
Monetary Policy in Times of Structural Reallocation

Relative demand is now given by \( \frac{Y_A}{Y_B} = f(P_B, \omega) \), which, combined with full employment in sector \( B \), \( Y_B = N_B \), implies that sector \( A \) output is

\[
Y_A = f(P_B, \omega) N_B. \tag{3}
\]

In this region, increasing \( M \) leads to higher output in \( A \) and to higher inflation in \( B \). To see this, note that (3) implies a positive relationship between \( Y_A \) and \( P_B \) which implies a positive relation with \( M = P_A Y_A + P_B Y_B \) (recalling that \( P_A \) and \( Y_B \) are fixed). Equation 2 then implies that also the wage \( W_B \) and \( M \) are positively related. To derive the cutoff \( M' \) notice that when \( P_B = p^* \) we reach full employment in \( A \), as \( f(p^*, \omega) N_B = N_A \). The cutoff is then

\[
M' \equiv N_A + p^* N_B.
\]

The crucial observation here is that inflation in this economy can help to get the relative price \( P_B / P_A \) right. In a flexible price equilibrium, the preference shock \( \omega \) requires the relative price of good \( B \) to increase, to match the relative supply of goods \( A \) and \( B \). This requires \( P_A / P_B \) to adjust to the new level \( p^* \). With flexible prices, that relative price adjustment can be achieved costlessly, and can be obtained either by letting nominal prices and wages fall in sector \( A \) or by letting prices and wages increase in sector \( B \). However, with nominal rigidities, and, in particular, with asymmetric rigidities that make wage reductions harder to achieve than wage increases, this adjustment cannot be achieved costlessly. In particular, an adjustment up of \( P_B / P_A \) requires costly inflation in sector \( B \).

This logic is directly reflected in the model’s welfare implications. In Chart 1, we show how \( M \) affects prices, allocations, and welfare in a simple example. The two cutoffs are given by \( M' = 0.962 \) and \( M'' = 1.041 \). The top panel shows the relation between \( M \) and unemployment in the two sectors. For \( M < M'' \) there is unemployment in sector \( A \) and unemployment is larger in \( A \) than in \( B \), due to the preference shock shifting demand toward the \( B \) sector. The middle panel shows inflation in the two sectors. For \( M > M' \) there is inflation in \( B \).
Chart 1
Optimal Policy with an Asymmetric Shock

Unemployment

Inflation

Welfare

Note. The example uses Cobb-Douglas preferences $\mathcal{G}(C_A, C_B; \omega) = C_A^{1-\sigma}C_B^{\sigma}$ and the following parameters: $\omega = 0.52$, $\bar{N} = 0.5$, $\varphi = 3.5$. 
as that sector is at full employment, and inflation is higher in $B$ than in $A$. In the bottom panel, we plot the welfare of the representative consumer, in consumption-equivalent units, that is, $C$.

The optimal level of nominal demand $M$ always falls in the intermediate interval $[M', M'']$. To the left of $M'$, increasing $M$ only has the favorable effect of lowering unemployment, without causing costly inflation in either sector. To the right of $M''$, increasing $M$ has no favorable effects on employment, causing only increased inflation. In the interval $[M', M'']$, optimal policy trades off inflation costs in sector $B$ against unemployment in sector $A$. In the example plotted in Chart 1, there is an interior optimum $M \in (M', M'')$, corresponding to the gray circle in the bottom panel.\footnote{5}

The relations just described—between $M$, sectoral inflation, and sectoral employment—can also be translated into an economy-wide, Phillips curve relation between aggregate unemployment, $1 - N_A - N_B$, and aggregate inflation, $P - 1$. This Phillips curve is plotted in Chart 2 for the example of Chart 1. The three regions for $M$ correspond, respectively, to the horizontal portion, to the downward sloping portion, and to the vertical portion of the curve.

Looking at the problem in terms of the aggregate Phillips curve in Chart 2, shows that an asymmetric preference shock acts as an endogenous cost-push shock. In the pre-shock steady state, the aggregate Phillips curve is simply an L-shaped relation going through the origin. In that case, divine coincidence holds: optimal policy corresponds to the point of zero inflation and zero unemployment. When the preference shock hits, the aggregate Phillips curve shifts outward and divine coincidence fails: the point of zero inflation and zero unemployment is unattainable, and the planner optimally picks a point on the downward sloping portion of the relationship. In our example, the optimal unemployment-inflation pair is denoted by the circle.\footnote{6}

It is useful to remark that the shape of our Phillips curve, in its downward sloping portion, is driven by different forces than usual. Usually the slope of the Phillips curve is driven by the fact that increasing real activity increases marginal costs, driving up the desired price of price setters. So, the shape of the Phillips curve
is determined by labor supply and by the curvature of the firm’s production function. In our model, in the intermediate region for \( M \), raising \( M \) increases activity in sector \( A \), but marginal costs in \( A \) are constant at 1, because technology is linear and there is a perfectly elastic labor supply at \( W_A = 1 \). On the other hand, raising \( M \) increases wages and marginal costs in sector \( B \), even though activity is constant in that sector. The relation between inflation (in \( B \)) and unemployment (in \( A \)) is solely driven by the fact that higher prices in \( B \) shifts relative demand in favor of good \( A \). The slope of the Phillips curve is not determined by the curvature of marginal costs, but by the elasticity of the demand curve (3), that is, by the degree of substitutability between the two goods. The price setting condition (2) determines the wage \( W_B \) as a residual, but does not affect the shape of the Phillips curve.7

The inflationary bias of optimal monetary policy identified here is related to the literature on optimal monetary policy and relative prices.

In the classic model of Aoki (2001), there is a sector with sticky prices and one with flexible prices. Aoki (2001) shows that optimal policy in this context consists of perfectly targeting inflation in the sticky sector, which, in fact, achieves divine coincidence. In our model, an exercise similar in spirit to Aoki (2001) comes from
reducing the price setting cost to zero, $\varphi \rightarrow 0$, as in that case prices are flexible in sector $B$, while they remain endogenously sticky in sector $A$ due to downward wage rigidity. In Chart 2, we plot the optimal policy when the cost of inflation $\varphi \rightarrow 0$. The shape of the Phillips curve is not affected by $\varphi$, as we observed earlier. However, the objective of the monetary authority changes, as the inflation cost go down. Reducing $\varphi$ moves the optimal point up and to the left, until, when $\varphi$ is low enough, the optimum corresponds to the kink with zero unemployment and positive inflation, shown by the asterisk.

In the model of Rubbo (2020), preference shifts such as hours only affect the allocation of labor across sectors, but do not cause any changes in prices or wages. Divine coincidence is also preserved in this model.

The settings in Woodford (2003) (Chapter 6) and Benigno (2004) are closer to that in this section, allowing for heterogeneous price rigidities and immobile labor across sectors (or equivalently, other fixed factors). These papers argue that inflation of the relatively more sticky sector should be weighted more heavily at the optimum. Since in our model, one sector has perfectly sticky prices downward (sector $A$), these papers’ results apply to our economy only in a degenerate form. The main gist, however, carries over, namely that allowing for more inflation in the less sticky sector can be optimal in order to correct relative prices.

A noticeable difference between the results in the literature and our results here is that in our context it is not possible to define a set of sectoral weights such that optimal monetary policy is obtained by targeting aggregate inflation measured using those weights. The simple reason is that in our model the identity of the sector with fixed prices and of the sector with flexible prices depends on the sign of the shock. A shock that shifts demand in favor of sector $A$ would require different weights from a shock that shifts demand in favor of $B$.

IV. Costly Mobility

An economy has two ways of adjusting to asymmetric shocks like the one we are studying here: either shift demand from sectors with excess supply to sectors with lack of demand, or to shift productive
capacity in the opposite direction. This raises two important questions. Is this process of factor reallocation efficient? Should concerns with factor reallocation influence the conduct of monetary policy, and, if so, in what direction?

To address these two questions, we add costly labor mobility to the model of the previous sections. Namely, we assume that the representative household can choose to move workers from sector $A$ to sector $B$. Since the sum of workers per household remains 1, the flow of workers can be equivalently expressed as $N_{Bt} - N_{Bt-1} = -(N_{At} - N_{At-1})$. We assume a simple quadratic cost of adjustment, in terms of consumption goods,

$$\frac{\psi}{2} \left( N_{Bt} - N_{Bt-1} \right)^2.$$

To derive the optimality condition for labor mobility, we need to take into account the possibility of labor rationing, that is, the fact that the probability of employment of a worker in sector $j$ is

$$\rho_{jt} = \frac{Y_{jt}}{N_{jt}},$$

and thus possibly smaller than 1. Therefore, the benefit of having a worker specialized in sector $j$ in terms of consumption goods is $\rho_{jt} \frac{W_{jt}}{P_t}$.

The first order condition characterizing optimal mobility then takes the simple form

$$\psi \left( N_{Bt} - N_{Bt-1} \right) = \rho_{Bt} \frac{W_{Bt}}{P_t} - \rho_{At} \frac{W_{At}}{P_t} + \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \psi \left( N_{Bt+1} - N_{Bt} \right)$$

where $r_t$ is the real interest rate. The interpretation of this condition is straightforward: the left-hand side represents the marginal cost of moving workers today, the right-hand side captures the marginal benefit, which includes the net flow benefit of shifting a worker from sector $A$ to $B$ plus the discounted lower cost of moving workers in the future.
To simplify the analysis, we continue to assume that the economy is in steady state, that an unexpected one-time shock hits at time $t$, and that from time $t + 1$ onward all adjustment costs are zero—not only the adjustment cost of nominal prices but also the mobility cost. The condition above is then replaced by

$$\psi(N_B - \bar{N}_B) = \rho_B \frac{W_B}{P} - \rho_A \frac{W_A}{P}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)$$

where we dropped time subscripts as before, and where $\bar{N}_B$ denotes the initial steady state labor allocation.

We can again characterize the equilibrium in period $t$ in terms of total nominal spending $M$. The remaining equilibrium conditions are analogous to those of the no-mobility case, they are presented and analyzed in detail in the appendix. In particular, as in the case with no mobility, there are three regions for $M$, characterized by different combinations of unemployment and inflation in the two sectors. However, the values of $N_A$ and $N_B$ are now endogenous and vary with $M$.

V. Optimal Policy and Reallocation

We now turn to the main question of our paper which is whether reallocation objectives impart a contractionary or expansionary bias to monetary policy.

To frame the question let use define the following objects—which apply to our model but can also be derived in a broader class of models. Let $V(M, N_B)$ denote the utility of the representative household at time $t$ as a function of nominal spending $M$ and of the mass of workers specialized in sector $B$. Let $\mathcal{N}(M)$ denote the equilibrium mapping between nominal spending $M$ and the mass of workers specialized in sector $B$, which comes from the optimal mobility choice analyzed in the last section.

The optimal monetary policy problem can then be described compactly as

$$\max_{M} V(M, \mathcal{N}(M)).$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)$$
The model with no mobility is a special case in which monetary policy simply solves \( \max_M V(M, \tilde{N}_B) \).

Assuming an interior optimum the first order condition for optimal monetary policy is

\[
\frac{\partial V(M, N(M))}{\partial M} + \frac{\partial V(M, N(M))}{\partial N_B} \cdot N'(M) = 0
\]

Our question can then be posed formally as asking what is the sign of the second term of this sum. Namely, does the presence of sectoral mobility add a negative or a positive social benefit to increasing \( M \)? In the first case, we say that reallocation concerns induce a contractionary bias in monetary policy, in the second, an expansionary bias.

**V.i. Fully Rigid Wages: A Case of Contractionary Bias**

It is useful to analyze first a variant of our model with a simpler form of nominal rigidity, in which the terms above can be derived particularly easily. This case will give us an example in which monetary policy shows a contractionary bias due to reallocation.

Let us modify our assumptions on pricing. Assume that nominal wages are completely rigid, both upwards and downwards, while good prices are perfectly flexible. In particular, assume that if in the market for good \( j \) there is excess demand, the price of good \( j \) adjusts up to the point where demand equals supply and the profits of the firms producing good \( j \) are rebated to the representative household.

With these assumptions, we still have three possible equilibrium configurations, as in Section III and the optimal policy will always be in the intermediate region, with full employment in \( B \), and prices satisfying \( P_A = W_A = 1 \) and \( P_B \geq W_B = 1 \).

Let us assume Cobb-Douglas preferences

\[ G(C_A, C_B, \omega) = C_A^{1-\omega} C_B^\omega, \]

so that demand in the two sectors as a function of nominal spending \( M \) is

\[ Y_A = (1 - \omega) \frac{M}{P_A}, \quad Y_B = \omega \frac{M}{P_B}. \]
In the intermediate case, with \( P_A = W_A = 1 \) and \( Y_B = N_B \), the function \( V \) takes the following form

\[
V(M, N_B) = (1 - \omega) M^{1-\omega} N_B^\omega - \frac{\psi}{2} (N_B - \bar{N}_B)^2,
\]

(7)

and the optimal mobility equation (4) becomes

\[
\psi(N_B - \bar{N}_B) = \frac{1}{P} - \rho A \frac{1}{P},
\]

(8)

given that wages are equal to \( 1/P \) in both sectors and \( \rho_B = 1 \).

Let us study separately the terms \( \partial V / \partial N_B \) and \( \mathcal{N}(M) \) in equation 6 in the context of this model.

Given a value of \( M \) in the interior of the intermediate region, we can differentiate 7 at the equilibrium value \( N_B = \mathcal{N}(M) \) and obtain

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial N_B} = \omega (1 - \omega) M^{1-\omega} N_B^\omega - \psi(N_B - \bar{N}_B) = \frac{P_B}{P} - \frac{1}{P} + \rho A \frac{1}{P} > 0.
\]

(9)

The second equality follows from \( \omega (1 - \omega) M^{1-\omega} N_B^\omega - \psi(N_B - \bar{N}_B) = \frac{P_B}{P} \) (which can be derived from the consumer expenditure minimization problem) and from condition 8. The last inequality follows from \( P_B > 1 \).

Inequality 9 shows that in equilibrium mobility between sectors A and B is inefficiently low. We call the expression in 9 a mobility wedge. Let us give some intuition for why this wedge is positive. First, workers undervalue the benefit of moving to sector B due to the fact that the social benefit accrues to the firms earning the additional profits \( P_B - 1 > 0 \). Second, workers overvalue the benefit of staying in sector A, as they do not internalize the fact that by leaving sector A they increase the probability of finding a job for the other workers in sector A.

To expand the interpretation of the last term in 7 as a congestion externality, notice that \( Y_A = (1 - \omega) M \) is fixed, for given \( M \), so we can totally differentiate

\[
\rho_A N_A = Y_A
\]
and obtain

\[ N_A d \rho_A + \rho_A d N_A = N_A d \rho_A - \rho_A d N_A = 0. \]

This implies that the effect of changing \( N_B \) on the incomes of other workers is

\[ \frac{W_A}{P} N_A \frac{d \rho_A}{d N_B} = \rho_A \frac{1}{P}, \]

which is precisely the last term in 9. This is a basic idea that will come back later: when workers leave a sector with insufficient demand they underestimate the social benefit that comes from reducing the queue of applicants for a demand-constrained number of jobs.

Notice a connection between the externality identified here and a similar externality arising in models with geographic mobility across different regions, affected by different shocks. In particular, Farhi and Werning (2014) identify a closely related externality in a model of a monetary union in which workers can move between countries.

Next we turn to the term \( N'_M(M) \). This term is negative for two reasons: easier monetary policy increases \( Y_A \) and, for given \( N_A \), it increases the job finding probability \( \rho_A \), moreover easier monetary policy increases the price of good \( B \) and so the price index \( P \), reducing real wages. Inspecting the right-hand side of 8 shows that both forces tend to reduce labor mobility.8

In this economy the monetary authority faces the following trade-off: increasing \( M \) increases activity in sector \( A \), reducing wasteful unemployment, but, at the same time, it reduces the incentive of workers to move from sector \( A \) to sector \( B \). Since workers do not fully internalize the benefit of moving from \( A \) to \( B \), the monetary authority has to balance the Keynesian wedge in sector \( A \) against the mobility wedge 8.

Chart 3 shows a numerical example in which this trade-off leads to an interior solution for \( M \) with \( \rho_A < 1 \).9 The plot only displays the intermediate region with unemployment in \( A \) and inflation in \( B \). The top panel shows the equilibrium relation \( N_B = N(A) \), which is decreasing in line with the derivations above. The next two panels
Chart 3
Optimal Policy in the Economy with Rigid Nominal Wages

Reallocation

Unemployment in A

Inflation in B
show the effects of $M$ on unemployment (in $A$) and inflation (in $B$). The bottom panel shows welfare, measured in terms of consumption. Notice that unlike in our baseline model, there is no direct cost of inflation in this model, so, absent reallocation motives, optimal policy would simply reach the boundary point where $\rho_A = 1$ and there is zero unemployment in $A$. Therefore, this is a case where the reallocation motive imparts a contractionary bias to policy. Even though unemployment in $A$ is wasteful, it plays a useful social role in stimulating reallocation toward $B$. This example captures the liquidationist view mentioned in the introduction.

**Vii. Expansionary Bias**

We now return to our baseline model with costly price adjustment. Once more, we focus on characterizing the second term in the optimal policy condition 6 and analyze separately the two factors in it. For the following derivations, we also assume Cobb-Douglas preferences.

Reallocation is generically inefficient and the expression for the mobility wedge is now

$$
\frac{\partial V}{\partial N_B} = \frac{\varepsilon - 1}{\varepsilon} \phi \left( P_B - 1 \right) P_B - \frac{\phi}{2} \left( P_B - 1 \right)^2 + \rho_A \frac{W_A}{P}.
$$

(10)
This equation is derived in Appendix B.

The three terms in this expression can be interpreted as follows. The first two terms capture the effect of $N_B$ on inflation costs. In particular, the first term is due to the following externality in price setting: an individual price setter (in sector $B$) does not internalize that by increasing the price of its variety it induces all other price setters to increase their price, leading to higher price adjustment costs collectively. When a worker moves from sector $A$ to sector $B$ it tends to lower the equilibrium price $P_B$. Due to the externality just described, lowering the equilibrium value of $P_B$ has a positive social value, so this term is positive.

The second term is more mechanical. In the standard formulation of Rotemberg price adjustment costs, which we adopted, these costs are scaled by the level of activity, which gives rise to a negative externality: increasing activity in the sector with positive inflation costs, sector $B$ here, raises total inflation costs. Therefore, the first two terms capture two externalities associated to inflation costs. Typically, the elasticity of substitution among varieties $\varepsilon$ is set to be larger than 2, which is a sufficient condition for the sum of these two terms to be positive.

The third term is the same congestion externality discussed above: moving a worker out of sector $A$ increases the job finding probability for the workers who remain.

Summing up, also in our baseline model, assuming $\varepsilon > 2$, the sign of the mobility wedge is positive: in equilibrium there is inefficiently low mobility from sector $A$ to sector $B$. So far, the model has similar features as the fully rigid one.

Let us turn now to the effect of monetary policy on mobility, that is, to the sign of $N'(M)$. Derivations in Appendix B show that in our baseline model with Cobb-Douglas preferences, we have $N'(M) > 0$. This is the opposite prediction from the fully rigid model: easier monetary policy stimulates reallocation, instead of discouraging it. Why? The reason is that now the mobility condition takes the general form
where both the job finding probability $\rho_j$ and the sectoral real wages are endogenous. A more expansionary monetary policy in this case leads to a real wage increase in sector $B$ that is stronger than the one in sector $A$, given that sector $B$ is supply constrained, and the relative changes in $\frac{W_B}{P}$ and $\frac{W_A}{P}$ more than undo the effect of a higher job finding probability $\rho_A$.

There are two forces that induce workers to move toward sector $B$: a low probability of finding a job in $A$ and a large wage premium when moving from $A$ to $B$. The model with fully rigid wages mutes the second force, so the only way for monetary policy to induce more mobility is to keep unemployment high enough in $A$. The model with upward flexible wages allows another channel to be at work: higher inflation helps, as it allows wages in sector $B$ to raise, setting the right price incentives to workers to move. Notice that, as in Section III, in an economy with downward rigid wages, a degree of inflationary bias helps to get relative prices right. The interesting thing is that, here, the relative price adjustment helps both on the demand and on the supply side of the adjustment process: it reallocates demand in favor of sector $A$, and it helps reallocate factors of production toward sector $B$.

Chart 4 shows a numerical example that illustrates our argument. The top panel shows that there is an increasing relation between $M$ and $N_B$ in the intermediate region, in contrast to the top panel of Chart 3. The middle panels show inflation and unemployment in the two sectors; these panels are qualitatively similar to those of the model with no mobility in Chart 1, and, in particular display the presence of the three regions.

The bottom panel of Chart 4 shows the model’s welfare implications. As in the model with no mobility of Section III the optimum is in the intermediate region, and features positive inflation in sector $B$ and unemployment in $A$. To visualize the bias introduced in monetary policy by the presence of endogenous mobility, in the same
Chart 4
Optimal Policy in the Economy with Downward Wage Rigidity and Sticky Prices

Reallocation

Unemployment in A and B

Inflation in A and B
panel we also plot welfare as a function of $M$, keeping $N_B$ fixed at the level $N_B^\ast \equiv A(M^\ast)$ where $M^\ast$ is the optimal level of $M$. That is, we plot the function $v(M,N_B^\ast)$, the dashed line, in addition to the function, $V(M,N_N(M))$ the black line. The two functions intersect, as they should, at $M = M^\ast$. However, while $V(M,N_N(M))$ reaches its maximum at $M^\ast$, the function $v(M,N_B^\ast)$ is decreasing at $M = M^\ast$ and reaches its maximum for some $M < M^\ast$. The interpretation of this fact is that, if monetary policy could keep $N_B$ at $N_B^\ast$, it would choose a less expansionary stance. In other words, the concern with facilitating sectoral restructuring leads the monetary authority to be more expansionary.

\textit{Viii. Phillips Curves}

As in the model with no mobility, it is instructive to look at the optimal policy problem in terms of the Phillips curve. The solid line in Chart 5 is the Phillips curve for the numerical example of Chart 4. The dark circle corresponds to the optimal policy. The dashed line is the Phillips curve of a model with the same parameters, but no mobility and $N_B = N_B^\ast$, constructed as the dashed line in the bottom panel of Chart 4. This plot provides additional intuition for the expansionary bias: the fact that $N_B$ responds endogenously to $M$ makes the Phillips curve flatter, inducing the central bank to choose lower unemployment and higher inflation. A central bank with a misspecified model of the economy in which $N_B$ is unaffected by $M$
would face the trade-off on the dashed curve. Such a central bank would perceive a larger inflationary cost of reducing unemployment, and thus choose a tighter monetary policy.\textsuperscript{11}

Next, we turn to a comparative static exercise and ask how labor mobility costs affect the central bank choices. In particular, we ask what happens to the Phillips curve and to optimal policy when we change the parameter $\psi$ and leave all other parameters unchanged. In Chart 5 the gray line and the circle represent, respectively, the feasible set and the optimal choice in an economy with $\psi = 25$ instead of $\psi = 5$ of our baseline example, that is, an economy with higher mobility costs. Reducing mobility costs—going from the gray to the solid line—has two effects. First, it shifts the Phillips curve toward the origin, as, for given $M$, it reduces both unemployment in $A$ and inflation in $B$. Second, it makes the Phillips curve flatter, because increasing $M$ has stronger effect on mobility. In the example of Chart 5, the optimal policy outcome is a reduction in unemployment and an increase in inflation. The central bank could choose to lower both inflation and unemployment, but the increased reallocation benefits incentivize easier policy, leading on net to higher inflation. Of course,

\textbf{Chart 5}

\textbf{Phillips Curve in the Model with Endogenous Mobility}

Note. Solid line: baseline model ($\psi = 5$). Dashed line: model with no mobility and $N_g = N_h$. Gray line: model with higher mobility costs ($\psi = 25$).
this is just an example and other parameter configurations can lead to lower inflation in response to lower mobility costs, but the example shows that not only the central bank has a more expansionary bias due mobility, but also that the bias may be strong enough that more mobility increases optimal inflation.

Finally, we use Chart 5 to address an additional policy experiment. Suppose that the social planner has access to an additional policy tool: a proportional subsidy to mobility from $A$ to $B$, financed with lump-sum taxation. In that case, the planner can choose both $M$ and $N_B$ optimally, solving $\max_{M, NB} V(M, N_B)$. This is illustrated by the circle in Chart 5, which in our example has zero unemployment and much lower inflation that in the case without the subsidy. The reason is that the mobility subsidy can be targeted to eliminate the mobility wedge. As more mobility is achieved, the Phillips curve shifts inward and the menu for monetary policy improves. The more general observation here is that tools that encourage labor mobility (or remove obstacles to mobility), allow the central bank, all else equal, to achieve a better mix of inflation and unemployment.

VI. Conclusion

The paper has explored the optimal conduct of monetary policy in the presence of asymmetric shocks, which can cause a permanent reallocation of resources among sectors.

Asymmetric shocks require adjustments in relative prices across sectors, and in the presence of downward nominal rigidity, this may lead to a more expansionary monetary policy being optimal.

Moreover, when labor can move across sectors, households do not internalize the benefits of labor reallocation towards the booming sectors, and incentivizing reallocation is desirable. Does easier monetary policy speed up or slow down such reallocation? We presented examples where both are possible. If the dominant effect of easier monetary policy is to improve employment prospects in the declining sector, reallocation tends to be slowed down; if instead easier monetary policy
has sufficiently powerful effects on relative wages, reallocation is accelerated. An investigation into which of these two forces is empirically stronger, is a promising avenue for further research.

Authors’ note: We thank Ricardo Caballero, Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Erik Hurst and Jing Cynthia Wu for very useful exchanges.
Appendix

A. Equilibrium with Costly Mobility

In this appendix, we give a full characterization of the equilibrium with costly mobility of Section IV, in the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences. Let us first summarize the equilibrium conditions

\[
\frac{\gamma_A}{\gamma_B} = f \left( \frac{P_B}{P_A}, \omega \right),
\]

\[
\epsilon \left( \frac{W_j}{P} - \frac{P_j}{P} \right) = \phi P \left( P_j - 1 \right),
\]

\[
\phi \left( N_B - N_B \right) = \frac{W_B}{P} \frac{\gamma_B}{N_B} - \frac{W_A}{P} \frac{\gamma_A}{N_A},
\]

\[
N_A + N_B = 1,
\]

and the labor market complementary inequalities

\[
Y_j \leq N_j, \quad W_j \geq 1.
\]

The price index \( P \) is defined from the expenditure minimization problem

\[
P = \min_{y_A, y_B} \left\{ P_A y_A + P_B y_B : G(y_A, y_B, \omega) = 1 \right\}.
\]

With Cobb-Douglas preferences, \( G(y_A, y_B) = Y_A^{1-\omega} Y_B^\omega \), the equilibrium can be solved using the following simple algorithm. For each labor allocation \( N_A, N_B \), equilibrium prices and quantities solve

\[
P_A = \max \left\{ (1 - \omega) \frac{M}{N_A}, 1 \right\} Y_A = \min \left\{ (1 - \omega) M, N_A \right\},
\]

\[
P_B = \max \left\{ \omega \frac{M}{N_B}, 1 \right\} Y_B = \min \left\{ \omega M, N_B \right\}.
\]

Real wages are then derived from

\[
\frac{W_j}{P} = \frac{P_j}{P} + \frac{\phi}{\epsilon} \left( P_j - 1 \right).
\]

These values can then be substituted in
It is possible to show that this defines an equation in $N_B$ with a unique solution and derive the cutoffs $M'$ and $M''$ that characterize the three possible regimes.

B. Derivations for Section

B.i. Deriving $\partial V / \partial N_B$

We focus on an intermediate equilibrium with $Y_A < N_A$ and $P_B > 1$. With Cobb-Douglas preferences output in $A$ is

$$Y_A = (1-\omega)M$$

and prices in $B$ are

$$P_B = \omega \frac{M}{N_B}. \quad (11)$$

Differentiating the last equation we obtain

$$\frac{dP_B}{dN_B} = - \frac{P_B}{N_B}. \quad (11)$$

Equilibrium consumption can be written as follows

$$V = Y_A^{1-\omega} N_B^\omega - \frac{\phi}{2} (P_B - 1)^2 N_B - \frac{\phi}{2} (N_B - \bar{N}_B)^2. \quad (11)$$

Differentiating with respect to $N_B$ and substituting $dP_B/dN_B$ yields

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial N_B} = \omega Y_A^{1-\omega} N_B^{\omega-1} + \phi (P_B - 1) P_B - \frac{\phi}{2} (P_B - 1)^2 - \phi (N_B - \bar{N}_B). \quad (11)$$

Remember that

$$\psi(N_B - \bar{N}_B) = \frac{W_B}{P} - \rho_A \frac{W_A}{P}$$

and
Substituting gives expression 10 in the text.

**B.ii. Deriving \( \mathcal{N}_c(M) \)**

From \( P_A = W_A \) and consumer demand for good \( A \) we obtain

\[
\frac{W_A}{P} = \frac{W_P}{P} = \omega(1 - \omega)^{1 - \omega} B^{-\omega}.
\]

Wages in sector B can be similarly derived as

\[
\frac{W_B}{P} = \frac{P_B}{P} + \phi e P_B (P_B - 1) = \omega(1 - \omega)^{1 - \omega} B^{-\omega} + \phi e P_B (P_B - 1).
\]

Substituting these expressions and the job finding rate \( \rho_A = (1 - \omega)M/N_A \), the optimal mobility condition is

\[
\psi(N_B - \bar{N}_B) = \omega(1 - \omega)^{1 - \omega} B^{-\omega} + \phi e P_B (P_B - 1) - (1 - \omega) M N_A^{-\omega} (1 - \omega)^{1 - \omega} B^{-\omega}.
\]

Substituting 11 gives the following implicit relation between \( N_B \) and \( M \)

\[
\psi(N_B - \bar{N}_B) = (1 - \omega)^{1 - \omega} \left( \frac{\omega}{N_B} - \frac{1 - \omega}{1 - N_B} \right) M^{1 - \omega} N_B^{\omega} + \phi e M \omega N_B^{\omega} (\omega M - 1).
\]

Since the right-hand side is increasing in \( M \), implicit differentiation shows that \( \mathcal{N}_c(M) > 0 \).
Endnotes

1Barrero et al. (2020), in line with the previous literature on job reallocation, stress that a lot of reallocation takes place within industries. While we use the label “sector” throughout the paper, our arguments can easily be extended to reallocation at a finer level, as long as there is some degree of segmentation and imperfect mobility across the labor markets different businesses tap into.

2Downward wage rigidity has not figured prominently in studies of optimal monetary policy. There is a long history of empirical evidence for an asymmetric response of wages. Most recently, Hazell and Taska (2020) employ micro data on posted wages and find that they adjust upwards in states where unemployment falls but do not fall in states where unemployment rises. See also the evidence in Grigsby, Hurst and Yildirmaz (2021).

3A recent paper that analyzes a rich version of this type of optimal policy problems, in an economy with a general production network and input-output structure is Rubbo (2020).

4The relation \( f \) is defined implicitly by the condition \( \frac{p_A}{p_B} = \frac{G_C(Y_A, Y_B, w)}{G_C(Y_A, Y_B, w)} \), where the right-hand side depends only on \( \frac{Y_A}{Y_B} \) by homotheticity.

5It can be shown that if \( \varphi \) is low enough, the optimum is necessarily reached at the cutoff \( M'' \). By contrast, the optimum is never at \( M' \) because inflation costs are second order at that point.

6Notice that a symmetric preference shock in our model would keep the Phillips curve unchanged, and would preserve divine coincidence. In that case, the central bank would face no trade-off between inflation and unemployment. So the asymmetry is crucial to the argument here.

7This result is special to the model used here, with marginal costs that are either completely inelastic or infinitely elastic. In more general models, with multiple sectors and heterogeneous firms, the slope of the Phillips curve at any point will capture both the curvature of marginal costs in each sector and the effect of relative price adjustments that shift demand from supply-constrained to demand-constrained sectors.

8The equilibrium condition for good \( B \) gives the price index

\[
P = \omega^{-\omega} (1 - \omega) - (1 - \omega) P_B^\omega = (1 - \omega) \omega \left( \frac{M}{N_B} \right)^\omega.
\]
Using the equilibrium condition for good $A$, equation 8 can then be rewritten as follows

$$
\psi(N_B - \overline{N}_B) = (1 - \omega)^{1-\omega} \left( \frac{N_B}{M} \right) (1 - \frac{1 - \omega}{1 - N_B} M)
$$

and implicit differentiation proves $N_\prime(N(M)) < 0$.

Since the cost of unemployment is first order, it is also possible that the optimum is at the upper boundary of the intermediate region, where $\rho_A = 1$.

Given that $M^*$ is characterized by the first order condition

$$
\frac{\partial V(M^*, N_B^*)}{\partial M} + \frac{\partial V(M^*, N_B^*)}{\partial N_B} \mathcal{N}(M^*) = 0,
$$

the condition $\frac{\partial V(M^*, N_B^*)}{\partial M} < 0$ illustrated in the bottom panel of Chart 4 is equivalent to the condition

$$
\frac{\partial V(M^*, N_B^*)}{\partial N_B} \mathcal{N}(M^*) > 0,
$$

which was the focus of our previous derivations.

This argument could be taken a step further, by considering an equilibrium in which the central bank chooses $M$ optimally using the misspecified model, the private sector adjusts $N_B$, and they reach a fixed point, that is, looking at the self-confirming equilibrium. The argument in the text suggests that the self-confirming equilibrium will feature higher unemployment and lower inflation relative to optimal policy with the correctly specified model.
References


Barrero, Jose Maria, Nicholas Bloom and Steven J. Davis. 2020. “Covid-19 Is also a Reallocation Shock,” Technical Report, NBER.


